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Equity and the Eco-System: Can Injunctions
Clear the Air?
On April 22, 1970, a number of private groups in the United
States sponsored "Earth Day," an attempt to turn the attention of
the population to matters of environmental concern. The dramatically favorable response to the idea of "Earth Day" 1 suggests the
extent to which more and more persons are becoming worried
about ecological destruction. One of the methods of preventing that
destruction, the obtaining of injunctions against industrial polluters, is the subject of this Comment. The central focus of this
Comment is upon the injunction as a means of preventing air
pollution, but most of the substance is equally applicable to the
obtaining of injunctions against other forms of pollution.2
It is clear that the injunction is not a panacea and that there
are some important philosophical objections to the use of injunctions as a weapon against pollution. The injunction is not a panacea
because it cannot effectively be used to combat problems of widespread concern. The problems of "thermal pollution," for example,
are caused by all of the machines which operate in the world; the
changes in climate which may result from thermal pollution and
other by-products of technological "progress"3 simply cannot be
reversed by an injunction. Similarly, the use of injunctions to attack
toxic forms of air pollution results in an episodic form of attack
upon the problem. Some industrial polluters are identified and required to alter their manufacturing processes while others are not
given this burden. Thus, legislative action is necessary for the
elimination of some environmental problems and is probably the
most desirable type of response to all problems of industrial air
pollution.4 In the absence of legislation, however, litigation is
preferable to inaction. Successful litigation can alleviate the harm
caused by some forms of industrial air pollution, and can also serve
as a catalyst for a more widespread legislative response. Even unsuccessful litigation can serve to provide important publicity. It is
for these reasons that the injunction can be a worthwhile method
of attacking air pollution.
It is, of course, true that courts may respond to actions for inI. See TIME, April 27, 1970, at 46. See also Murdoch &: Connell, All About Ecology, !I
THE CENTER MAGAZINE 56 Gan. 1970).
2. The recent development of concern for environmental quality has not, of course,
been limited to the problem of air pollution. The Sub-Mariner, for example, has
recently declared war against the surface world for polluting his oceans. 25 PRINCE
NAMOR, THE SuB-MARINER 11 (May 1970), at 17-18.
!I. See Murdock &: Connell, supra note 1, at 61.
4. See generally Krier &: Neustadter, ECO-Law, UCLA Daily Bruin, April 21, 1970,
at 6, 8.
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junctions in ways that are repugnant to the majority of the people.
The historical background of the National Labor Relations Act
presents one instance in which that result occurred. 5 But the response of Congress to those injunctions against unions that were
obtained before that Act was passed presents an example of the
reason that actions for injunctive relief against polluters are important. Whether or not the court decisions are right, the existence
of court decisions increases the likelihood of a legislative decision.
To the extent that the court decisions are in accord with the will of
the majority, there can be little objection to the principle of obtaining injunctions against those industries which contribute to
toxic air pollution.

I. THE

NATURE OF THE

AIR POLLUTION PROBLEM

Air pollution has been recognized as a problem for centuries,6
but its crisis proportions have been seen in the United States only
in the last decade. 7 Now that air pollution is so extensive, many
contemporary scientists are exceedingly pessimitic about the prospect for clean air in the future. 8
Throughout the past decade, scientists have assimilated a vast
amount of data that exemplifies the pervasive nature of the air pollution menace. 9 It is now apparent that air pollution damages plant
5. See generally R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAw

2-44 (1968).
6., In England, attempts to control air pollution have been made since 1300 and · ~
have included torture and death for those found to be polluters. For a brief history of
air pollution control practices, see H. LEwrs, WITH EVERY BREATH You TAKE 16-20 (1965)
[hereinafter LEwrs].
7. See TIME, Feb. 2, 1970, at 56-63. Four out of five Americans feel air pollution
is the most important of all the environmental problems facing the nation. NATIONAL
WILDLIFE FEDERATION, AT WAR WITH WASTE 5 (1969).
8. E.g., Hill, Air Pollution Grows Despite Rising Public Alarm, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19,
1969, at I, col. 3 [hereinafter Hill); Dale, N.Y. Times, April 19, 1970, § 6 (Magazine),
at 27. Although automobile exhaust emissions are a major contributor to pollution,
emissions from industrial processes and other stationary sources pose the most serious
problems. Anderson, Effects of Air Contamination on Health, in THE POLLUTION READER
141, 153 (1968) [hereinafter Anderson); Havighurst, Foreword, Symposium on Air
Pollution Control, 33 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 195 (1968).
9. The adverse effects of air pollution have been summarized as affecting society in
several ways:
[R)esearch continues to provide new evidence that air pollution is objectionable,
not only for its esthetic and nuisance [effects], which we can see and smell, and its
economic damages, which are more varied and costly than we had supposed, but
also because of its hazards to health and safety.
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 88th CONG., 1ST SESS., A STUDY OF POLLUTION
-AIR vii (Comm. Print 1963) [hereinafter A STUDY OF POLLUTION]. Further evidence of
the damaging effects of air pollution has been accumulated since 1963. See Gerhardt,
Incentives to Air Pollution Control, 33 LAw & CoNTEMP, PROB. 358 (1968): "There is
small if any doubt that air pollution can and has caused substantial social and economic
losses. Its role is well documented in experiments, tests, and experience gathered from
major episodes." Id.
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and animal life10 and interferes with hemispheric weather pattems.11
Air pollution also creates a number of distinctly human problems.
It impairs the enjoyment of recreational activities12 and daily
offends the senses of residents of urban areas. In addition, reduced visibility attributable to dirty air makes air travel and other
forms of transportation more hazardous. 13 These adverse effects of
air pollution have been thoroughly analyzed. Dr. William Stewart,
while Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, declared that
contaminated air is "unquestionably a factor in the development of
not one, but many diseases affecting literally millions of our people."14 Moreover, air pollution can impair personal efficiency
through its psychological effects15 and can directly affect perception
and reaction time. 16 Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to
measure the adverse effects of air pollution in monetary terms, the
cost in terms of personal suffering, necessary medical treatment, and
rehabilitation is staggering.17
Some of the damage caused by air pollution is more susceptible
to monetary measurement. The annual loss to agriculture as a result
of contaminated air has been extensive in recent years, and the
amount of that loss is rapidly increasing; advanced industrial
processes are producing a variety of new contaminants which cause
more extensive damage than the pollutants that have been dis10. Anderson 142, 145; A STUDY OF POLLUTION 18-19. It is important to remember
that man's tolerance level may be higher than that of other animal species or of
vegetation. But since all groups must interact in the environment, emissions which
affect one will affect all others eventually. Anderson 158-59.
11. A STUDY OF POLLUTION 22; Wall St. J., Dec. 31, 1969, at I, col. 6.
12. A STUDY OF POLLUTION 22.
13. This safety hazard is especially significant for air travel. In examining a sample
of air disasters in 1962, the Civil Aeronautics Board tied poor visibility caused by air
pollution to six crashes in that year alone, and estimated that as many as fifteen to
twenty air accidents might have been attributable to such pollution-caused poor visibility. Id. at 21; Anderson 157.
14. Hearings on S. 780 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the
Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 3, at 1131 (1967). There is
strong evidence that air pollution is associated with a number of respiratory ailments
including lung cancer, bronchial asthma, pulmonary emphysema, chronic constrictive
ventilatory disease, chronic bronchitis, and nonspecific infectious upper-respiratorytract diseases, including the "common cold." A STUDY OF POLLUTION 14-18. See generally
LEWIS 135-50, for a discussion of the health studies that have been done concerning
pollution and health. It is also notable that specific instances of severe pollution in
a number of cities have been responsible for illness and death to thousands. See
Anderson 144; LEw1s 18-20; Cassell, The Health Effects of Air Pollution and Their Implications for Control, 33 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 197, 201 (1968).
15. LEw!s 143-44; A STUDY OF POLLUTION 22.
16. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEW, PUBLIC HEALTH SERv., TODAY AND To~ORROW IN AIR
POLLUTION (1966) [hereinafter U.S. DEPT. OF HEW]; NATIONAL TB & R.EsPIRATORY
DISEASE AssN., AIR POLLUTION PRIMER 75 (1969).
17. The damage caused to health and related forms of injury are far more costly,
by any measure, than all other types of damage combined. A STUDY OF POLLUTION 13.
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charged into the air in the past.18 The dollar amount of this loss
to agriculture is estimated to be hundreds of millions of dollars
annually.19 A great deal of nonagricultural property loss is also
attributable to air pollution.20 Polluted air has been found to injure
trees and other nonagricultural vegetation, to speed the corrosion
of metals, and to increase the rate of deterioration of rubber, building stone, and other materials.21
Thus, the present dimensions of air pollution are extremely
severe.22 Unfortunately, there is reason to believe that the problem
will become even more serious. The ever-increasing consumer demand for better consumer goods-a demand that expands in direct
proportion to continuing urbanization, the population explosion,
18. Certain contaminants have been known to affect vegetation more than 100
miles from their point of origin. A STUDY OF POLLUTION 18.
19. National Conference on Air Pollution, Report from the Panel on Agriculture,
Natural Resources, and Economic Considerations 19 (1962). Smog damage to agriculture has been observed in at least twenty states. In New Jersey, for example, damage
has been observed in every country and has involved 36 commercial crops. N.Y. Times,
April 2, 1970, at 16, col. 3.
20. A figure once developed by the Department of Health, Education, and "Welfare
is $65 per person per year or about $II billion annually for the nation. A STUDY OF
POLLUTION 20. Many recent articles suggest that the costs may be much higher. See, e.g.,
J. BREGMAN&: s. LENORM'.AND, THE POLLUTION PARADOX 65 (1966); Wolozin, The Economics of Air Pollution: Central Problems, 33 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 227, 228-29 (1968).
21. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEVv. See also A STUDY OF POLLUTION 20-21 for an analysis
of the costs to stores, hospitals, hotels, and the like for repairs and replacements-costs
often running in the millions of dollars. As a result of the increased rate of deterioration of building materials that is caused by air pollution, real-estate values in the
United States are estimated to drop two hundred million dollars per year. LEWIS II5.
In the San Bernadino Valley near Los Angeles, 1,000 acres of ponderosa pines have
been fatally afilicted by smog from the city. N.Y. Times, April 2, 1970, at 16, cols. 1-2.
22. Some feeling for the dimensions of the problem of air pollution in the United
States can be obtained by examining the number of people affected:
[I]n over 300 cities, a total of more than 43 million people live under an air
pollution hazard that the Public Health Service calls major.
In addition, some 30 million other people (about 15 per cent of the nation)
live in 850 other cities with air contamination that is somewhat less severe but too
serious to be classified as minor.
LEw1s 2. "About 7,300 places, housing 60 percent of the population, are confronted
with air pollution problems of one kind or another." A STUDY OF POLLUTION vii.
It is also interesting to view the degree of pollution in terms of the amount of pollutant material that is discharged into the air. The average fallout of solid material in
New York City, for example, is about 60 tons per square mile per month; in Chicago's
Loop, as much as 120 tons have fallen on a square mile in a month. J. BREGMAN&: S.
LENORMAND, supra note 20, at 54-58. That article includes tonnage estimates of both
particulate and nonparticulate pollutants for a number of cities as well as for the
nation as a whole. In New York City, the annual emission of sulfur dioxide from the
combustion of fuels is estimated to be in excess of 1.5 million tons. Katz, Nature and
Sources of Air Pollution, in THE POLLUTION READER 163, 167-76 (1968). A medium-size
copper smelter emits 1,500 tons of sulfur dioxide per day, an oil refinery 450 tons, and
a coal-fired power plant 300 tons; a cement plant may emit as much as 150 tons of dust
a day. LEWIS 43-44, 59. The Lewis book includes examples from other sources and
esimates for various cities.
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and income growth-and the resultant increase in industrial production, will cause the types and amounts of contaminants in the air
to multiply unless the problem is vigorously attacked.23 Of course,
even vigorous action cannot achieve absolute purity of the air, but
a substantial reduction in the amount of pollutants being discharged
is technologically feasible. 24 Most observers agree that pollution
control cannot be achieved through reliance upon voluntary efforts
by those who pollute.25 Thus, the extent to which technology will
be used to combat air pollution depends largely on the willingness
of the public to act through their governments. 26 Accordingly, most
of the discussion in the pertinent literature centers on the question
whether direct governmental regulation is a better method of control than economic incentive.27 Those persons who urge direct governmental control have been successful advocates: with the exception
of nuisance actions brought by private plaintiffs, virtually all of the
recent attempts to deal with air pollution have been in the form
of regulatory statutes, ordinances, or administrative rulings. 28 Despite some criticism,29 this type of direct regulation will probably be
used in the future. 30
23. Stepp & Macaulay, The Pollution Problem 3, in LEGISLATIVE AND SPECIAL ANALY·
SES OF THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY REsEARCH, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. (No. 16, 1968); A STUDY OF POLLUTION vii; Dale, The Economics of Pollution,
N.Y. Times, April 19, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 27.
24. A single pollution control device on one smoke stack can remove as much as
28 tons of particles each day that would otherwise go into the air. Detroit Free Press,
Jan. 27, 1970, at 8.
Since the passage of the Clean Air Act in Britain in 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 52, London
has reduced its industrial smoke by 82% and sulfur-dioxide output has declined 28%,
merely as a result of smoke control. Des Moines Register, March 23, 1970, at 15, col.
2-3. For a description of the operation of Britain's Clean Air Act, see J. GARNER & R.
CROW, CLEAN AIR-LAW AND PRACTICE (1964, Supp. 1967).
25. Stepp & Macaulay, supra note 23, at 3; LEWIS 252-53.
26. See id; cf. Van Ginkel & Van Ginkel, The Phenomenon of Pollution, in THE
POLLUTION READER 13, 15 (1968).
27. Some suggested economic incentives include effluent fees, effluent payments,
and equipment tax credits.
28. Havighurst, supra note 8, at 195.
29. For an indication of possible adverse effects from too strict an application of
uniform pollution regulations, see Hagevick, Legislating for Air Quality Management:
Reducing Theory to Practice, 33 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 369, 376-77 (1968); Stepp &
Macaulay, supra note 23, at 17-21, 37, 40-43.
30. Havighurst, supra note 8, at 196; Wolozin, supra note 20, at 232; Gerhardt,
supra note 9, at 366.
The Air Quality Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), settled the
question of alternatives to direct regulation. It operates mainly through the use of
emission standards; ultimate control resides in air quality regions, and HE'W has the
power to approve individual state control programs. The use of localized standards
meets some of the criticism of strict regulations, because it allows consideration of such
matters as ambient air quality and the economics of limited geographic areas, before
emission levels are set. For a general discussion of the 1967 Act, see Martin & Symington,
A Guide to the Air Quality Act of 1967, 33 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 239 (1968); O'Fallon,
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THE RoLE OF PRIVATE LmGATION

In spite of the trend toward governmental regulation as the primary means for combatting air pollution, private litigation does
have an important role in the fight to obtain clean air. Govermental
enforcement agencies have not been particularly successful in the
past in reducing pollution,31 and it is unlikely that they will improve their performance significantly in the near future. 32 The ineffectiveness of the regulatory agencies responsible for controlling
Deficiencies in the Air Quality Act of 1967, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 275 (1968). The
usual regulation governs the permissible levels of pollutant emissions and the like,
but many also directly control the use of particular equipment or fuels. Most regulations are promulgated by commissions that have been established pursuant to state
law and which usually have a great deal of discretion as to what type of regulation
they may issue. See, e.g., :MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 336.15 (1967).
One example of a multifaceted control approach is found in New York City
where there are regulations dealing with emissions, fuel types, equipment, and the competency of equipment operators. Cousins, New York's Fight Against Pollution, SATURDAY R.Ev., March 7, 1970, at 53. Pittsburgh is another city with a very comprehensive
set of air pollution regulations. See Allegheny County Health Dept. Rules & Regs., Air
Pollution Control, art. XVII Gan. I, 1970). The federal government has also recognized
the need for a variety of control methods to limit emissions from federal buildings
and facilities. 42 C.F.R. § 76 (1970).
Injunctions are increasingly being sought to thwart the application of air pollution
regulations. In New York City, for example, about 400 landlords have individually
enjoined the city's efforts to enforce air pollution controls on apartment incinerators.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1970, at 61. In New Jersey, DuPont and Company has filed suit
against the state claiming that the imposition of a prohibition against the burning
of fuel containing more than one per cent sulfur is an unconstitutional deprivation of
the company's property. SATURDAY R.Ev., May 2, 1970, at 60. In the State of Washington, two citizens' groups, the ,vashington Environmental Council and Clean Air for
,vashington, are seeking in a class action to intervene in a suit brought by owners of
a copper smelter against the Puget Sound Air Pollution Control Agency. The copper
owners claim that when the regulations dealing with sulfur-dioxide emissions are applied to their smelter, they are unconstitutional. The citizens' groups base their claim for
intervention partially on a contention that the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, creates a statutory right to a healthful environment and that this is enforceable in court by private citizens. 2 AIR & WATER NEWS,
Feb. 11, 1970, at 1-2.
31. In commenting on the many recently filed environmental suits, Professor Joseph
L. Sax stated that "[i]f there's a theme to all these suits, it's an attempt to circumvent

relatively ineffective regulatory agencies." Wall St. J., March 26, 1970, at I, col. 6.
See also Hill 61, col. 4, for a discussion of recent reports by federal and state pollution control officials. For an interesting example of the frustrations which may arise
in dealings with balky pollution control agencies, see Boyle, My Struggle To Help the
President, SPORTS !LLUSTRA.TED, Feb. 16, 1970, at 32 (water pollution).
32. The importance of a private action varies inversely with the amount of
governmental action. The condition of the environment has recently become a major
political issue, and consequently it may be hoped that there will be a rapidly rising
governmental commitment accompanied by meaningful action. It has been suggested,
however, that much of the recent emphasis on environment is only rhetoric. See, e.g.,
Kenworthy, Nixon's Pollution Policy, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1970, at 42, col. I. See also
Hill 61, at cols. I, 3, suggesting that many pollution control boards are dominated by
representatives of the very industries that they are supposed to be regulatiµg.
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air pollution is, in most cases, the result of a low budget,33 a lack
of personnel,34 and weak or nonexistent enforcement powers.35 As
a result of these agency difficulties, public enforcement in the air
pollution field must be selective, and is unlikely to be directed at
local, sporadic, or nonflagrant violations.36 Accordingly, private
actions may be necessary if such violations are to be attacked.
It is, of course, entirely possible that private legal action will
never have a significant effect on air pollution. But fear that the
method will not be successful should not discourage its use, for it
certainly will do no harm. There are a number of functions which
may be served by private suits. First, private actions may be used
in cases involving certain rather significant types of pollution that
simply are not covered by existing statutes.37 Second, private actions
may be used to fill gaps in an existing governmental regulatory structure. The latter purpose is likely to become particularly important
in the near future when the problem of air pollution may well become so severe that the government will be unable to cope with it
effectively. In that event, private suits will provide a means for attacking pollution violations that are ignored by governmental agencies either because those agencies are too overburdened with work to
prosecute all offenders or because the particular pollutant discharges
are considered too insignificant to warrant official attention. There
may, for example, be an instance of pollution that is minor in comparison with the emissions of major polluters, but which is nevertheless injurious to persons residing in the area affected by the
33. In 1966, for example, the total budget for all governmental air pollution control
programs combined was $20 million; the estimated need was $72 million. See U.S. DEPT.
OF HEW 21-23, 26.
34. Hill 61, at cols. 2-3. The Department of Air Pollution Control in New York
City alone receives over 50,000 complaints a year. Hagevick, Legislating for Air Quality
Management: Reducing Theory to Practice, 33 LAW &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 269, 385 (1968).
In 1965 there were approximately 1,200 trained persons working in the field of
air pollution, but 7,000 persons were needed. Existing training programs are thoroughly
inadequate to the task of supplying the number of professionals required to meet demand. U.S. DEPT. OF HEW 25.
35. Hill 61, at col. I. In the rare circumstances in which money, personnel, and
available sanctions have all been adequate-as in the City of Los Angeles-significant
control of industrial pollution has been shown to be feasible. Id. at col. 2.
36. Id. at cols. 2-3 (citing examples of limited action by control agencies in a
number of cities and states).
37. For example, although the 1967 Air Quality Act authorized the Secretary of
HEW to establish air quality regions and ambient air standards, very little progress
has yet been made in establishing adequate regulations. In his message to Congress on
pollution, President Nixon indicated a recognition of the problems in the 1967 Act and
he proposed amendment to it. Notwithstanding this request, comprehensive legislation
seems a long way off. For the text of the President's message, see N.Y. Times, Feb. II,
1970, at 32, col. I. The difficulties of establishing a comprehensive scheme are intensified by the proliferation of groups and programs concerned with the environment.
There are now thirteen congressional committees involved, 90 separate federal environmental programs, 26 quasi-governmental bodies, and fourteen interagency committees.
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 1970, at 33.
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pollution; in such cases, overworked state or federal agencies may
not consider it appropriate to direct enforcement efforts to the
solution of the problem.38 The availability of private relief in such
a case would provide the aggrieved residents with a means of redress
for the injuries which they are suffering. Moreover, such private actions would help to enforce governmental policy, and would relieve
some of the burden on governmental officials, thereby speeding the
process of effective pollution abatement.39 Indeed, several states have
recognized the utility of private injunction suits to protect against
public nuisances and have passed statutes specifically authorizing
such suits.40
Private actions may also serve a significant purpose in situations
in which there are existing statutes prohibiting the kind of pollutant
discharges involved and in which there are governmental agencies
willing to enforce those statutes. In such situations, enforcement
by private suits may be preferable to blanket administrative enforcement of a statutory scheme.41 Present knowledge about the
ill effects of air pollution is still far from complete, and some writers
fear that if a solely regulatory approach were taken to the problem
of air pollution, then quality standards would be likely to become
entrenched in the law, and would be difficult to change even if new
evidence were produced that would justify raising the quality standards or even if improved technology were to make more efficient pollution control economically feasible. 42 The ability of courts to hear
new evidence and to shape remedies in light of that evidence, particularly in equity actions, leads to the conclusion that courts may
be more responsive than legislatures and administrative agencies to
38. On March 14, 1970, Trout Unlimited, a national conservation organization,
sponsored a conference on water pollution, held at the Student Union of Michigan
State University. At that conference, representatives of the Michigan Attorney General's office raised the problem discussed in the text, when they commented that
the office's limited resources and manpower made necessary a highly selective approach to the prosecution of violators of the Michigan antipollution laws.
39. An analogy might be drawn to the encouragement of private enforcement actions
that is found in the antitrust laws, although the incentive of treble damages is clearly
absent in the environmental-law field. In the area of water pollution control, however,
the Federal Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411 (1964), passed in 1899, allows one-half of
the fine collected from a polluter to be paid "to the person or persons giving information which shall lead to conviction of this misdemeanor."
40. E.g., Wis. STAT. .ANN. § 280.02 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 60.05 (1969). Some
legislatures currently have bills pending which would allow citizen suits brought
specifically to protect the environment. See note 93 infra and accompanying text.
41. See note 29 supra.
42. Anderson 158. The same problem arises if an industrial defendant can defend
on the grounds that statutory standards are being complied with. Traditionally, however, an action for an injunction against conduct which violates criininal laws will be
entertained only if the plaintiff has a personal interest different from the public interest.
See Goose v. Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit, 305 Ky. 644, 205 S.W.2d 326 (1947); text
accompanying notes 140-47 infra. Accordingly, there would be no purpose in allowing
the statutory standards to constitute a defense, for those standards necessarily represent the public's needs, not the plaintiff's needs.
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rapidly changing knowledge concerning the dangers of air pollution
and to improved control techniques that make stricter emissions
standards reasonable. 43 Finally, private litigation may serve a publicity function-especially in cases involving many plaintiffs and
important defendants. In such cases, private suits provide a forum
for the advocacy of new legal theories for controlling polluters,
provide a means of informing the public about the faftS of air pollution, and perhaps may help to generate pressure for new and stricter
air quality laws. 44

III. PREREQUISITES FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
In private suits against industrial contributors to air pollution,
plaintiffs usually seek only injunctive relief, although in some cases
a request for an injunction is coupled with a demand for damages.411
Damages alone are seldom requested, for such an award does not
prevent the continuation of the harmful practice of discharging contaminants, which in most cases is the primary concern of the plaintiff. 46 Indeed, if a recovery of damages would be sufficient to
compensate a plaintiff, injunctive relief might well be unavailable. 47
The continuing nature of the harm is not, however, the only
factor that makes the damage action inappropriate for most cases.
Damage action is also unlikely because of the difficulties that confront a plaintiff in attempting to sustain a claim for monetary
relief. In the typical air pollution case, damages are difficult both
to measure and to disperse fairly among the victims of the pollution.48
43. In fact, Professor Eric J. Cassell suggests that it may be necessary to return to
a sophisticated and broadly based nuisance law approach if progress in abatement is
to occur. He feels that statutory control by dealing with one pollutant at a time is
inadequate. Cassell, supra note 14, at 197. Stepp and Macaulay, however, seem to
believe that the best use of pollution control resources requires a more systematic
scheme for abatement than nuisance law would provide. Supra note 23, at 29-30.
44. An example of this type of suit might be the 1969 class action brought on be•
half of all the residents of Los Angeles County against virtually every corporate
polluter in that county. In that action, damages totalling approximately $500 billion
dollars were sought, in addition to other remedies. Diamond v. General Motors Corp.,
No. 947, 429 (Super. Ct., Cal., filed April 15, 1969). The case was so large that it probably
was not taken seriously by the court (the judge who dismissed the suit called it
"Diamond vs. The World'), yet it generated a great deal of publicity and may have
helped to educate the public as to the widespread nature of the sources of pollution.
45. E.g., Alfred Jacobshagen Co. v. Dockery, 243 Miss. 571, 139 S.2d 632 (1962);
Harden Chevrolet Co. v. Pickaway Grain Co., 27 Ohio Op. 2d 144, 194 N.E.2d 177
(C.P. 1961).
46. If the pollution is allowed to continue, the payment of damages by the polluter
makes no real sense. Unlike the water pollution situation-in which purifying the
water is possible and is measurable in terms of costs, and in which the plaintiff, at
least in theory, could use the monetary damages to help in purifying the water that he
wishes to use-the inestimable health effects of foul air will continue to effect the
plaintiff regardless of whether damages are paid.
47. See text accompanying notes 124-36 infra.
48. See notes 9-17 supra and accompanying text.
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Moreover, damages are difficult to attribute to a particular defendant because, except in rare cases such as poisoning by a single
pollutant from a single source, it is impossible to isolate completely
the effects of one contaminating discharge from those of another.49
Thus, when a damage action is brought, a court is faced with the
request that it make an award of damages in an amount that is subject to much dispute and against a particular defendant who cannot
be singled out as the party causing the plaintiff's injury. A court
will be hesitant to make a damage award under those circumstances.
But this hesitance is not likely to exist when the plaintiff requests
injunctive relief, since it is usually demonstrable that the polluter
is causing some harm and that the plaintiff has suffered some injury.
Because an action for damages is usually clearly inadequate,
equitable relief should generally be available in air pollution
cases50 unless an equitable defense is applicable.51 In practice,
however, the extreme nature of the burden that has been placed
upon the plaintiffs in most cases of this type has prevented success
in suits against all but the most blatantly culpable polluters.52 But
today, the growing information about the harmful effects of air
pollution, the burgeoning public concern for a clean environment,
49. This is especially true for health effects because individuals are subject to
many kinds of contaminants for long periods of time at varying exposures. LEWIS 142;
Cassell, supra note 14, at 197. The major contaminants and their basic sources are
known, however, and some attempt at catologing their individual effects has been
made. These basic contaminants include carbon monoxide, sulfur oxides, nitrogen
oxides, hydrocarbons, photo-chemical smog, and particulate matter. For explanations
of their sources and effects, see generally U.S. DEPT. OF HEW; Anderson 148-53; LEWIS
1-114 (pollutants and sources listed); Cassell, supra note 14, at 201 (emphasis on the
effects of sulfur dioxide). The difficulty of isolating the effect of a specific pollutant is
compounded by the existence of synergistic effects which occur when certain types
and concentrations of two or more pollutants exist in the air simultaneously, often
reacting with the sun.
Most of the preceeding discussion has dealt with the problems of pollution in
the aggregate. At any particular time and place, however, the seriousness of the problem
is dependent upon a number of variables. These include the type and quality of
pollutant, wind speed and direction, topography, sunlight, precipitation, and decrease
or increase of air temperature. The effect of pollution on an individual is a function
of concentration and exposure time. In any given suit to enjoin air pollution, it is necessary to become well versed in the relationship among these variables and the geographic
locale of the suit. It would be particularly important to understand the major types
and sources of pollution in the area and the effects that could be attributed to them.
50. The adequacy of the legal remedy, and the requirement that for equitable
relief to be available there must be no adequate legal remedy, is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 124-36 infra.
51. The various equitable defenses are examined in the text accompanying notes
124-53 infra.
52. E.g., Gerring v. Gerber, 28 Misc. 2d 271, 219 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1961) (injunction
denied when odor from defendant's cleaning establishment was no more than what is
to be expected from that type of business). See note 179 infra.
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and the liberal development of the rules of equity53 all suggest
that a trend of greater success in actions for injunctions against
air polluters will soon emerge. The nature of that trend can best
be seen by an examination of the basic elements of such an action.

A. Justiciability
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the power of
the judiciary to deciding "cases or controversies," 54 and many state
courts require similar grounds of justiciability.55 Such limitations
mean, in essence, that courts may entertain only justiciable controversies that are based upon the alleged denial of some recognized
legal right. 56 They also mean that courts may adjudicate only
genuine disputes based upon specific demands for relief by parties
who claim to have been aggrieved, and that courts may not entertain
collusive actions. 57 Furthermore, the article III provision of the
federal constitution has been held to preclude the rendering of advisory opinions at the federal level. 58
Since the scope of equitable jurisdiction defines the justiciability
of various claims in equitable actions, the question of justiciability
of air pollution claims can best be evaluated by considering the
traditional limitations on equitable jurisdiction. One of the principles of equity that has traditionally been stressed, although with
some exceptions, is that an injunction ·will issue only when the
plaintiff has alleged an invasion of property rights. 59 Today, that
view is probably in the minority, and most courts recognize that an
injunction may issue to protect some purely personal rights. 00 Nevertheless, there is still a greater hesitancy to protect personal rights
than there is to protect property rights. In air pollution cases that
hesitancy is likely to be particularly pronounced since the plaintiffs
53. Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REv. 994, 996 (1965)[hcreinafter Injunctions].
54. U.S. CoNsr. art m.
55. See, e.g., Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc., 62 Cal. 2d 129, 396 P .2d 924, 41 Cal. Rptr.
468 (1964); Gribben v. Interstate Motor Freight Sys. Co., 18 Ill. App. 2d 182, 151 N.E.2d
443 (Ct. App. 1958).
56. Cf. Tilleston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COURTS § 12 (1963).
57. See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943); Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 251 (1850).
58. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). Some states do, however, permit
the issuance of advisory opinions. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 56, § 12; Comment, Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statutes, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1302
(1956).
59. See, e.g., Chappel v. Stewart, 82 Md. 323, 33 A. 542 (1896). The property damage
attributable to air pollution, however, should mean that even this strict requirement
is met in most air pollution suits.
60. Injunctions 999.
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in such cases will probably not be able to demonstrate the egregious
type of invasion of personal rights that has led many courts to reject
the doctrine that equity protects only property rights. 61 Rather, the
plaintiffs may have to rely on an indirect threat to health or the
more amorphous injuries to aesthetic and other intangible interests.
The burden on the plaintiffs is clearly lighter when an actual or
threatened economic loss or a direct damage to health is at issue
than when such factors are not present. 62
One reason that equity courts may be hesitant to intervene to
protect interests in environmental quality is that such interests
traditionally have not assumed a position of high priority in the
hierarchy of human values, 63 and the degree of protection that
equity will afford to a particular interest invariably corresponds to
the position of that interest in the value hierarchy. 64 Because of the
loosely defined character of equitable doctrines and procedures,
courts of equity are particularly sensitive to the value structure and
are responsive to changes that occur within it. 65 The premise of
equity-that no ·wrong should be without a remedy 66-seems to presuppose this sensitivity, since what constitutes a "wrong" at any
given point in time is in large part determined by the contemporaneous value orientation of the society. Thus, while courts of equity
have become increasingly willing to intercede to prevent injury to
highly regarded personal interests such as privacy and personal
security,67 they have not been as willing to use equitable remedies
to redress injury to less highly valued personal interests, such as the
desire for environmental quality. 68 Fortunately, however, values in
61. See, e.g., Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S.W. 233 (Tex. Ct. App. 1924), in which the
defendant interfered with the plaintiff's privacy in several ways, including listening to
her private conversations, making false charges against her to public officials, and
causing her employer to dismiss her. Under these circumstances, the court was willing
to issue an injunction.
62. The reason for this difference in burdens is clear. Equity courts traditionally
did not accept jurisdiction unless property rights were involved, and although the
courts of equity have, in their evolution, disregarded the traditional per se rule, they
have retained part of the effect of the historical rule. Thus, it can fairly be said that
there exists a continuum, and that as the rights involved become more "personal," and
less tangible, the likelihood of equitable relief declines.
63. Cf. Stepp & Macauley, supra note 23, at 1-3.
64. See generally notes 59-62 supra and notes 67-69 infra and accompanying text.
65. H. MCCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 1 (1948) [hereinafter MCCLINTOCK].
66. Id.§ 29.
67. See, e.g., Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S.W. 233 (Tex. Ct. App. 1924); Edison v. Edison
Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (1907); Long, Equitable Jurisdiction To
Protect Personal Rights, 33 YALE L.J. 115 (1923).
68. While courts often enjoin pollution when specific property damage is shown,
they have seldom considered the more amorphous idea of damage to the environment in general. Rather, they usually seem to accept a "Smoky City" as an inevitable consequence of economic well being [Elliott Nursery Co. v. Duquesne Co.,
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America are currently undergoing a dramatic restructuring which
is likely to elicit a response from courts of equity. America is beginning to undergo the evolution of its "land ethic" 69 and to recognize that the health hazard caused by air pollution, albeit indirect
in most cases, is very significant indeed. As the nation is becoming more affluent, production and consumption are becoming less
important and the importance of environmental values is increasing. Increases in wealth are leading to a substitution of leisure for
work70 and to a corresponding concern with the environment in
which that leisure will be enjoyed.
The first definite indication of a court's willingness to respond
to this change in the value hierarchy came in the recent case of
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC. 71 In that case, a
conservation group challenged a decision by the Federal Power
Commission (FPC) to grant an electric-utility company a permit
to construct a power plant on Storm King Mountain in New York
State. The conservation group originally sought to intervene before
the FPC to prevent the erection of the power plant. After failing in
that attempt, the group petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to set aside the utility company's permit
because the FPC had not satisfied its statutory duty to consider alternative plans that would not adversely affect the scenic beauty of
the mountain. The court of appeals held that the group was competent to make such a demand:
In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will adequately protect the public interest in the esthetic, conservational,
and recreational aspects of power development, those who by their
activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest in such areas,
must be held to be included in the class of "aggrieved" parties under
[the statute]. We hold that the Federal Power Act gives petitioners
a legal right to protect their special interests.72
The United States Supreme Court recently indicated its support
for this reasoning in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp.73 The Court, referring to aesthetic, conserva281 Pa. 166, 173, 126 A. 345, 346-47 (1924)], and have denied relief when the pollution
is of the kind to be expected from the business involved. Gerring v. Gerber, 28 Misc.
2d 271, 219 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1961). It has even been held that an individual can surrender his right to pure air simply by electing to live in a city which has air pollution. Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 721, 82 N.W.2d 151, 158 (1957).
69. See A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 221-24 (1966).
70. For an analysis of the economic principles involved, see K. COHEN &: R. CYERT,
THEORY OF THE FIRM: REsOURCE AI.LOCATION IN A MARKET ECONOMY 79-81 (1965).
71. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
72. 354 F.2d at 610. The court noted that Scenic Hudson had an economic interest
in the area since it had constructed a series of nature trails around the mountain
which would be covered with water if the utility company's reservoirs were created.
But the decision did not rest on that finding.
73. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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tional, recreational, and spiritual interests, stated in dictum that
"we mention these noneconomic values to emphasize that standing
may stem from them as well as from ... economic injury." 74 Although Scenic Hudson and Data Processing are both cases of highly
limited applicability, they may be indicative of a trend in the courts
toward a recognition of the increased public interest in environmental quality. To the extent that these two cases are representative,
it is becoming increasingly likely that courts of equity will be
willing to consider issuing injunctions in cases involving only environmental interests.
Another reason why equity courts may not be willing to entertain conservation suits is that suits challenging pollution-particularly air pollution-involve a variety of interests that are public,
rather than purely private in nature. Judicial tribunals have historically been charged with the responsibility of alleviating disputes and
settling controversies between individuals; 75 when conduct affecting
the public interest is at issue, legislative and executive institutions
have been thought of as the appropriate mechanisms for redress. 76
The traditional view has been that such public controversies involve
broad questions of policy and are therefore more appropriately
dealt with through governmental regulation than through adjudication. Yet important societal problems, such as those posed by air
pollution, may well deserve judicial attention, especially if the other
branches of government neglect them, or decline to act. As Archibald
Cox has written: "If one arm of government cannot or will not
solve an insistent problem, the pressure falls upon another . . . .
[T]he need for judicial action is strongest in the areas of the law
where political processes prove inadequate, not from lack of legislative power but because the problem is neglected by politicians.." 77
74. 397 U.S. at 154.
75. The United States Constitution, for example, speaks mainly of the judicial
power extending to controversies involving individual citizens. Art. III, § 2.
76. This phenomenon may be seen in the provisions of the Air Quality Act of
1967, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-57l (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), and in the discretionary power of
administrative agencies to grant licenses permitting activities that play affect the
environment. E.g., Federal Power Act § 10, 16 U.S.C. § 803 (1964); Atomic Energy Act
§§ 101-10, 42 u.s.c. §§ 2131-40 (1964).
77. Cox, Foreword: The Supreme Court-1965 Term, SO HARv. L. REv. 91, 122
(1966). Professor Cox also comments that "[i]n the long run the actual response of
Congress to the Court's invitation is likely to have more influence upon the course
of decisions than the bare clarification of its authority .•••" Id. This indicates once
again the importance of the publicity function which is served by court actions. Of
course, Professor Cox's approach would engender a wave of criticism from the local
critics of "activism" by the Supreme Court. See Beaney, The Warren Court and the
Political Process, 67 MICH. L. REv. 343, 348-52 (1968). The notion that citizens should
be permitted to bring private actions against polluters in order to redress wrongs to
purely public interests is a novel one; and, in the absence of statutory authorization,
"[c]itizens or taxpayers have not to date been permitted to bring an action against a
public nuisance as such, and it has been held, for example, that the device of a class
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Indeed, there is reason to suspect that the current wave of governmental activism against polluters may waver somewhat and that even
the present inadequate level of regulation may be tempered as the
conservation movement begins to interfere more significantly with
American industry, for American governmental institutions are resistant to changes which encroach upon powerful vested interests.78
The American system is a hybrid democratic process which exalts
interest groups rather than individuals. For most purposes this
political arrangement is thoroughly satisfactory, but it becomes ineffective when any particular interest group obtains a disproportionate amount of power. At the present time, it is arguable that a
disproportionate amount of power is held by interest groups that
are deeply imbued with the production-consumption concept of
economic value. It is true that other, less tangible values are being
championed with increasing vigor by growing segments of the
population; but in order to succeed in any effective way, these groups
must somehow influence the entrenched bases of power. Equity
courts may provide one means for achieving that success; and the
magnitude of the pollution menace is such that they should not be
hesitant to exert influence, especially if the other branches of government neglect that menace or decline to act.
If, however, the plaintiffs in an injunction action base their
claim on the general nature of the pollution menace, it is clear that
the action is based upon the notion of obtaining an injunction
against a public nuisance. Accordingly, it is likely that some difficulty
will be presented by the equitable rule that although injunctions
will issue to prevent a public nuisance, 79 the injunction must be
action will not permit them to bring a suit which they could not bring as individuals." Jaffe, Standing To Sue in Conservation Suits, Sept. 11-12, 1969 (a paper given
before the Conference on Law and the Environment, Airlie House, 'Warrenton, Va.).
However, Professor Sax of the University of Michigan, in an explanatory memorandum
attached to the proposed Natural Resource Conservation and Environmental Protection
Act which he drafted for the West Michigan Environmental Action Council, states that:
The idea of citizens suing to protect the public interest is not a novelty at all.
Michigan itself has long permitted citizens to sue "in the name of the State of
Michigan" on behalf of the public nuisances. Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated
(MCLA) 600.3805. That particular statute is limited to such nuisances as houses
of prostitution and gambling dens, but the principle of the public suit is well
established and it might well be asked whether the principle might not more
needfully be applied to the conservation of our resources than to prostitutes and
gamblers.
Indeed, such suits are permitted to be brought to enjoin a wide range of improper conduct in many states. At least a dozen states have statutes like Michigan's,
and Wisconsin (WSA 280.02) and Florida (60.05) permit private citizens to sue on
behalf of the public to enjoin public nuisances-itself a rather broad conceptgenerally.
78. See Hill 61, at col. I, suggesting that the vested interests of polluters are difficult
to overcome.
79. Larson v. State ex rel. Patterson, 266 Ala. 589, 97 S.2d 776 (1957); People ex rel.
Bennett v. Laman, 277 N.Y. 368, 14 N.E.2d 439 (1938); Attorney General v. Jamaica
Pond Aqueduct Corp., 133 Mass. 361 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1882).
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requested by a governmental agent rather than by a private interest
group. 80 In many respects, this principle is analogous to the general
hesitance of courts to determine matters of public policy through
private adjudications. If, in a particular case, the general hesitance
can be overcome for the reasons suggested above, then it is entirely
possible that the rule concerning injunctions against public nuisances will also be overcome. 81 Nonetheless, it is important to keep
in mind that plaintiffs in injunction actions involving air pollution
will encounter serious difficulties with both the reluctance of courts
to recognize the public interest in a healthy environment, and the
hesitance of courts to issue injunctions which have a serious effect
on public policy.
Fortunately, however, most injunctive actions against air polluters will not be grounded solely upon an alleged injury to intangible interests. As has been stated, the bulk of the cases concerning
toxic air pollution will now involve alleged injuries to property and
health as well as to conservational values. Thus, if a plaintiff in an
air pollution suit is to present a justiciable claim, it will be most advantageous for him to demonstrate that he has been deprived of some
right protected by statute or common law. 82 If deprivation of a private right can be shown, the need to rely upon the public-nuisance
theory can be averted.
Furthermore, the maxim that equity follows the law-that a
plaintiff must have a recognized legal right before an injunction
will be available83-makes it important that pertinent private rights
be examined. There are a number of theories under which a
plaintiff may assert that he has rights which are being infringed by
air pollution. The oldest and most common theory which may be
advanced is that of private nuisance. 84 An individual has the right
to enjoy his property free from the encroachment of nuisances
created by other persons or institutions.85 That right includes the
right to be free from unwarranted interferences with reasonable
comfort and convenience in the occupation of the property.86 Thus,
air pollution constitutes a nuisance if it lowers the value of his
80. Massachusetts Soc. of Optometrists v. Waddick, 340 Mass. 581, 165 N.E.2d 394
(1960).
81. See also

w.

PROSSER,

LAW OF

TORTS 625 (3d ed. 1964).

82. See 4 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 1338 (5th ed. 1941) [hereinafter
POMEROY).
83. See Chafee, Does Equity Follow the Law of Torts?, 75 U. PA. L. REv. I (1926).
Chafee rightly considers the rule to be unsound, but it cannot be ignored.
84. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 81, §§ 87-92.
85. Id. at § 90.
86. Id.
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property or offends his sensibilities to the extent that it seriously
interferes with his right to the quiet enjoyment of his property.87
The real problem with the application of nuisance law to air
pollution suits lies in defining the scope of the term "nuisance." As
one commentator has noted, our society is dedicated to growth and
progress and so not every encroachment upon existing values and
utilities should be considered a nuisance.88 Accordingly, the costs
and benefits flowing from an alleged nuisance must be measured
and weighed. Some relatively slight infringements will clearly be
permissible and some relatively severe infringements will clearly
constitute nuisances. There can be no precise formulas for drawing
the necessary distinctions; but the expanding body of information
concerning the effects of air pollution and the increasing recognition in the law that noneconomic values are worth protecting
suggest that it would be wise as a matter of policy to expand the
nuisance concept so that it includes a number of the harmful results
of toxic air pollution. Such an approach to the concept of nuisance
would not involve any reform of the concept itself. Rather, it would
involve recognition of the fact that the harm which is now known
to result from toxic air pollution is very similar to the types of harm
that have traditionally given rise to a cause of action for nuisance.89
In recent years, there has been a substantial amount of writing concerning the relationship between air pollution and traditional
concepts of private nuisance.90 Although there is disagreement as
to the importance of applying nuisance law in this area, there appears to be a consensus that it is the most appropriate basis for a
claim in some kinds of cases. 91
In certain cases a plaintiff will have a statutory right to seek an
injunction against an air pollut-er causing a public nuisance.92 Bills
87. E.g., Fortin v. Vitali, 15 Mich. App. 657, 167 N.W.2d 355 (1969); Riter v.
Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957); Waier v. Peerless
Oil Co., 265 Mich. 398, 251 N.W. 552 (1933).
88. Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 .AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1967).
89. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 81, at 594-605.
90. For quite different appraisals of the potential of a nuisance law approach, see
Cassell, supra note 14, at 197; Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MlcH. L. REv. 471, 485 n.45 (1970); Currie,
Trail Blazer-at-Law, TRIAL, Aug.-Sept. 1969, at 23. See also Juergensmeyer, Control of
Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1957 DUKE L.J. 1126; 13erger,
Air Pollution as a Private Nuisance, 24 WASH. 8c LEE L. REv. 314 (1967).
91. See note 90 supra. Since legal and equitable claims may be combined, a plaintiff
may be able to obtain a jury determination of his right to damages. But see Harden
Chevrolet v. Pickaway Grain, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 144, 194 N.E.2d 177 (Ohio 1961) (no jury
allowed when damage claim only incidental to request for an injunction). While a
finding by a jury that defendant's conduct constitutes a nuisance would not require
the judge to enjoin that conduct [Storey v. Central Hide 8c Rendering Co., 148 Texas
509, 226 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. 1950)], it might very well make it more difficult for him
to refuse to do so.
92. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
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have recently been introduced at both the federal and state level
which would grant plaintiffs the right to bring a private action to
enjoin an act of pollution, and these statutes eliminate the need to
rely upon public-nuisance law theories. 93 Moreover, in those jurisdictions which have no statute specifically granting a right to an
injunction, it is arguable that private citizens have an implied right
to such a remedy. That right may be found in the general policy,
implicit in regulatory acts governing pollution, that condemns pollutant-discharges above a certain level. There is no compelling reason why such statutes should be read to grant exclusive enforcement
rights to governmental agencies, unless such exclusivity is explicitly
provided for in the statute; indeed, the policies underlying such
regulatory statutes will probably be better served if private citizens
are permitted to enforce the statutory standards. 94 The rule that
courts will not enjoin criminal acts95 may, however, lead to a hesitancy to enjoin acts which come within a regulatory statute. But if
the statute is construed merely as a legislative recognition that certain acts constitute nuisances, an injunction should be available. The
mere existence of a statute will not prevent the issuance of an in93. See National Air Quality Standards Act, S. 3546, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970);
Natural Resource Conservation and Environmental Protection Act, Mich. H.B. 3055,
75th Legis. (1970). An act similar to that proposed in Michigan has been introduced
in New York. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1970, at 1, col. 4.
94. It has been suggested by Professor David Currie, for example, that even in the
absence of specific statutory authority, federal standards can be enforced by private
action. Supra note 90, at 23. The existence of statutory standards could, however,
have a limiting effect on private action either because such suits might be barred as
attempts to remedy a public nuisance (see notes 140-50 infra and accompanying text),
or because it might be held that meeting the standards constitutes an absolute defense.
The existence of standards and of an agency to enforce them could also cause judges
to require exhaustion of administrative remedies before allowing a court suit. Such a
requirement would cause little hardship to plaintiffs if the agency were to act quickly
and firmly, but past performance by most agencies suggests that delay and equivocation are more likely. LEwis 254-55.
The reason given for introduction of a New York bill (see note 93 supra) allowing
private suits to protect the environment was that state agencies had failed to enforce
the laws adequately. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1970, at 1, col. 4. The proposed bill in the
Michigan Legislature (see note 93 supra) allows the court in which an environmental
protection action is brought to remit the parties to the appropriate agency, but it
docs not require the court to follow that procedure.
While the question of pre-emption by federal regulation is still at issue in some
areas of environmental protection [Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution: State Authority and Federal Pre-Emption, 68 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1083 (1970); Note, JurisdictionAtomic Energy-Federal Pre-Emption and State Regulation of Radioactive Air
Pollution: Who Is Master of the Atomic Genie?, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1294 (1970)], the
Air Quality Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), has largely settled
the question of pre-emption by federal air-pollution standards. With the exception of
automobile exhaust standards, the Act allows states and regions to set their own
standards subject only to HEW approval. As to automobile exhaust standards, see
Currie, A!otor Vehicle Air Pollution, supra.
95. See text accompanying notes 140-47 supra.
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junction that would be proper in the absence of the statute.96 The
essence of such an argument is that the injunction operates to put
an end to the nuisance which the activities themselves constitute,
and that the statute is important only as an indication that those
activities do constitute a nuisance.
If a governmental body is itself the polluter-through, for example, a municipally-mvned coal-burning power plant, citizens affected by that pollution may claim that the government has denied
them life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 07 Such
an argument appears specious, however, and should probably not
be advanced. 98 Nonetheless, there is an advantage to the assertion of
a constitutional basis for relief, because some cases suggest that if
a court accepts such an argument, an injunction will issue as a
matter of right. 99
Another potential basis for relief is contained in the argument
that air pollution constitutes a violation of the public trust. 100 The
essence of such an argument is contained in the theory that certain
environmental rights are held in common by the entire body politic.
These reserved rights are limited, but they do include an interest
in the preservation of a viable biosphere. Since the government is
the trustee of the public interest, it has a duty "in equity and good
conscience . . . to act in good faith and with due regard to the
'interests of those reposing the confidence."101 If such an approach
is accepted, it may easily be concluded that the government has
breached its duty, for the smog in major cities and the growing evidence of the serious threat presented by pollution indicate that the
government has been at best a negligent guardian and at worst a
fraudulent fiduciary.
If a court accepts this general public-trust notion, it will probably be willing to give a private plaintiff some means of making
the government a more responsible and zealous trustee. One manner
in which this result might be accomplished is by allowing private
citizens to bring mandamus actions to compel governmental officials
to perform their statutory duty to take action against offending
polluters. Such a cause of action has been advocated by at least one
96. Goose v. Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit, 305 Ky. 644, 205 S.W.2d 326 (1947).
97. The argument is that the governmental unit is creating unjustifiable risks of
of serious harm. Currie, Trail Blazer-at-Law, supra note 90, at 23. Professor Currie
also suggests subtantive due process may be used as a theory on which to attack
pollution. Id. Others have suggested the ninth amendment's reservation of power to
the people might serve as a constitutional basis for fighting pollution. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 14, 1969, at 78, col. 4.
98. Cf. Sax, supra note 90, at 553 n.248.
99. But see Injunctions 1007, suggesting that courts adopt a balancing approach
even when constitutional rights are violated.
100. See generally Sax, supra note 90, at 556-57.
101. Neagle v. McMullen, 334 Ill. 168, 175, 165 N.E. 605, 608 (1929).
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noted commentator, and one state court has ruled that a mandamus
action of this type is judicially cognizable.102 Another approach
would allow private plaintiffs to circumvent the governmental agen102. Professor Jaffe has concluded that twenty-nine states allow any citizen to test
the legality of official conduct by seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the official
to perform statutory duties. Standing To Sue in Conservation Suits, Sept. ll-12, 1969
(a paper given before the Conference of Law and the Environment, Airlie House,
Warranton, Va.).
Under federal law, § 1361 of the 1962 Mandamus and Venue Act, 28 U.S.C. (1964),
allows a plaintiff to bring an action for mandamus in a district court "to compel any
officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed
to the plaintiff." The traditional rule concerning the availability of the '\\-Tit of
mandamus to compel public officials to perform their administrative duties is that
a court will mandate an official to perform only duties that are ministerial in character.
Accordingly, courts will not mandate officials to perform discretionary duties. See Parker
v. Kennedy, 212 F. Supp. 594, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the
Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory Judicial Review of Federal Administrative .t1ction", 81 HAR.v. L. REv. 308 (1968). Thus, the question whether a writ
of mandamus may be obtained by private citizens seeking to compel public officials to
take action against polluters depends upon whether the official's authority is deemed
ministerial or discretionary.
In a recent Minnesota case, Sierra Club v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency and
Commissioner of Conservation, No. 662,008 (Cir. Ct., Minn. Oct. 3, 1969), two conservation groups sought a ,\Tit of mandamus to compel the Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency to hold hearings to determine whether Reserve l\fining Company's permit to
discharge wastes into Lake Superior should be revoked on the ground that the Company had exceeded permissible levels of pollution discharge. The conservation groups
contended that the agency had a statutory duty to hold hearings to determine whether
the Company was violating the conditions of the permit. The agency answered that
it could not be compelled to hold a hearing since such an order would be tantamount
to ordering it to perform a discretionary function. The court rejected the agency's
argument and reasoned that the plaintiffs were not seeking to control the agency's
exercise of discretion, but were simply requesting the agency to carry out its statutory
duty to hold a hearing. Thus the court held that a writ of mandamus could issue to
compel the agency to hold hearings concerning the Company's violation of its permit.
This case illustrates at least one situation in which private citizens may mandate
public officials to perform their public duties, and it suggests a means by which
plaintiffs may avoid the rule that courts will not mandate officials to perform discretionary tasks. The standing of the conservation groups in the Minnesota case was
premised on the statutory provisions requiring public hearings for the revocation of
an effiuent discharge permit. The court stated that
[I]t cannot be denied that the public generally has a vital interest in preserving
the quality of the waters of this state and that the public hearing provisions of
the permits are also for the protection of the public. A public right has been
created and can be enforced by the public generally.
At the federal level, a number of attempts have been made to use § 1361 to compel
officials to initiate judicial or administrative proceedings. Those attempts have been
rejected on the ground that a court may not compel an administrator to perform discretionary duties. In Byse & Fiocca, supra at 348-49, for example, the authors review
prior cases and state that:
In each of these cases a plaintiff attempted to coerce the exercise of a power
which in our legal system is, without question, broadly discretionary; and in none
of them did he advance a convincing argument ••. that in some other statute
Congress had limited that traditional prosecutor's discretion. Thus the court
properly refused to order a United States Attorney to institute proceedings to
prevent and restrain alleged violations of the anti-trust laws [Parker v. Kennedy,
212 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)] ••• or to order the Federal Communications
Commission either to conduct a hearing to revoke the permit of a Chicago television station [In re James, 241 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)] or to issue a cease and
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cies and to file private actions directly against polluters, if the government neglects or refuses to take action. 103
Finally, a number of traditional tort theories might serve as
bases for injunctive suits against air polluters. For example, the
emission of contaminants into the air might be considered to constitute a nontrespassory invasion104 of the rights of citizens affected by
the contaminants. Indeed, it is arguable that the doctrine of strict
liability should apply to the emission of hazardous substances into
the atmosphere.105 Although the notion of strict liability is not specifically applicable in equitable actions, it is likely that an injunction
would be easily available if the nature of the defendant's act were
thought to give rise to strict liability. A plaintiff might also claim
that the act of discharging contaminants into the air violates the
duty of care which the polluter owes to the public.106 Moreover,
some courts have accepted the argument that an instance of heavy
pollution amounts to an actual trespass.107
The attempt by a plaintiff to solve the novel legal problems of
obtaining an injunction against air pollution with existing legal
doctrines may not be a simple task, at least when there is no clear
nuisance upon which he may rely, and no statute to which he may
refer. But the very novelty of the issues suggests that courts should
not adopt a rigid, doctrinaire approach to the determination of
the question of justiciability. The nature of the injuries that result
from various types of pollution indicates that traditional legal
theories, designed primarily to redress purely personal grievances,
do not take into account the full legal significance of a suit to enjoin
abuse of the environment. Moreover, weighty policy considerations
suggest that courts should refrain from the incongruous practice of
recognizing a wrong only when there is some technical legal doctrine
that precisely applies to it. In the air pollution field, expediency
desist order prohibiting the station from continuing to televise bullfighting from
Mexico City. [National Anti-Vivisection Soc. v. FCC, 234 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. III.
1964)]. Matters of this kind traditionally have been committed to the discretion of
the official involved, and "the recently enacted [section 1361] does not alter the
situation." [Parker v. Kennedy, 212 F. Supp. at 595].
It is arguable that if a federal statute created an affirmative duty to hold hearings,
an agency could be mandated to carry out its functions. In such a circumstance, the
reasoning of the Minnesota case would apply to the federal sector as well.
103. See note 93 supra and accompanying text,
104. R.EsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939).
105. E.g., Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 73 Md. 268, 20 A. 900 (1890); Holman
v. Athens Empire Laundry Co., 149 Ga. 345, 100 S.E. 207 (1919). See generally W.
PROSSER, supra note 81, § 77.
106. R.EsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934).
107. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1960); Davis v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 445 P .2d 481 (Ore. 1968).
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should be the goal of courts of equity, and ingenuity should be the
means for achieving that goal.108

B. Standing
In conjunction with the notion that only genuine disputes are
justiciable, the United States Supreme Court has consistently adhered to the doctrine that a party, in order to present a justiciable
claim, must have "such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult ... questions."109 Thus, the mere fact
that a right exists does not mean that it may be asserted by every
person; the standing doctrine, which is a loosely defined and flexible110 concept, allows the assertion of a particular right only by a
person who is in some way aggrieved by the denial or threatened
denial of the right.111
The individual plaintiff who is able to show that pollution will
cause actual or threatened economic loss to him or damage to his
health, will not face difficulty in establishing that he has standing.112
But in cases instituted by plaintiffs such as conservation groups,
who must rely on amorphous injuries to intangible interests, the
standing issue poses a real obstacle to successful litigation. Yet even
in those cases, it is arguable that the standing doctrine should not
prevent a conservation group from obtaining equitable relief. It
cannot be denied that most conservation groups have a fervent and
an earnest interest in the values which they represent, and so actual
or threatened injury to those values seems to give such groups a
significant stake in the outcome of an injunctive suit against a
polluter.118
108. "\\Then discussing new theories as possible bases for relief, many writers suggest
a caveat: that no one cavalierly bring suit based on a new theory. These writers fear
that the decision in a badly prepared case could set very undesirable precedent. In
fact, Donald Harris, chairman of the Sierra Club's legal committee, believes the two
worst problems in environmental litigation are the use of "half-baked" theories and
poorly prepared cases. Not only do such ineptitudes result in losing actions, they also
lessen the credibility of other suits, use up time and resources, and often create bad
law. Address at the Univ. of Michigan, March 10, 1970.
109. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
110. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1968).
Ill. See D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 59-60 (1968).
112. In most private litigation, the plaintiff's interest in the relief sought is obvious.
See H. HART &: H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS .AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 174-75
(1953); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CoURTS § 13 at 36 (1963).
113. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). Noneconomic values, including aesthetic, conservational, and recreational ones, were recently mentioned by the Supreme Court as pos•
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The application of the standing doctrine cannot, however, be
analyzed solely by reference to the rule that a plaintiff must have a
stake in the outcome of the controversy. One of the reasons for the
existence of that rule is the desire of courts to ensure that the plaintiff in any particular case will be a representative advocate of the
rights he is attempting to assert.114 In purely personal suits, the
plaintiff may be presumed to be a fit advocate since his interest in
the outcome of the litigation is clear. Moreover, in such suits the
fitness of the plaintiff is not a particularly important consideration,
since other individuals will not be significantly affected if the plaintiff is less than a vigorous advocate.
But in actions which are of a public character, it can be expected
that courts will pay close attention to the question of fitness. If such
a "public suit" is permitted,: 15 the problem arises that any person
will have the ability to force a defendant to appear in court or suffer a default judgment. When the remedy sought is an injunction,
that problem is particularly troublesome since a failure to appear
might lead to eventual imprisonment for contempt.116 Moreover, in
the context of an air pollution suit, it can be anticipated that certain
industrial defendants who receive disproportionate amounts of publicity will be subjected to severe harassment through the courts.
Accordingly, it is desirable to place some limitations on the ease
with which public suits may be brought. The requirement that the
plaintiff have some minimal personal interest117 is no real safeguard,
for everyone has some personal interest in eliminating toxic air
pollution. Similarly, actions for malicious prosecution118 or the
assessment of attorneys' fees against plaintiffs who bring spurious
suits119 are not likely to be effective deterrents, for experience teaches
that the use of such measures will be too sparing to be effective. 120
Thus, the choice must be made from among three possibilities: the
concept of a public suit may be abandoned, at least with respect to
cases involving toxic air pollution; all public suits may be permitted;
or public suits may be permitted only when it appears that the plainsible bases for standing. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
114. Most obvious denials of standing occur when the plaintiff is not likely to argue
the case vigorously. D. CuRRIE, supra note 111, at 65.
115. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 402-04 (1959).
116. The severe liinitations on the freedom of an individual to disobey an invalid
injunction are important in this regard. Those limitations were established in United
States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947), and were reaffirmed in Walker v.
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). But see In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962).
117. Cf. K. DAVIS, supra note 115, at 402-04.
118. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 60, at 870-75.
119. Cf. 28 U.S.C. §§ 133l(b), 1332(b) (1964).
120. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 112, at 96 (1963).
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tiffs will be effective advocates of the interests which they claim to
represent. It is likely that courts will opt for the last of these alternatives, since that is the option which permits courts to proceed with
the greatest degree of flexibility. The decision as to fitness cannot,
of course, be made in isolation; it will generally be true that the
more meritorious a position is, the more easily it can be advanced.
Accordingly, the difficulty which the fitness standard will impose can
be expected to vary inversely with the apparent merits of the case.
The language of recent cases suggests that courts will, and should,
be willing to make this judgment of fitness. 121 But it is not easy to
make such a discrimination among plaintiffs, and no more concrete
rule can be stated than that a court should carefully examine the
question whether a particular plaintiff will be an inappropriate
advocate and should therefore be denied standing.122 Such an appraisal will probably have little effect upon the ability of conservation groups to bring injunctive actions, for such groups will often
be the most apt parties for litigating questions involving conservational values. They will usually possess the expertise and the financial resources necessary to conduct a vigorous legal assault, and are
likely to represent public conservationist sentiment accurately, since
they are composed of a number of citizens.
If a conservation organization wishes to minimize the likelihood
that standing will be denied, there are a number of preparatory
steps which the organization might take. In many cases, conservation
groups can avoid the standing problem entirely by locating a person
who is directly and significantly affected by the pollution in question
and then assisting in a suit filed in his name.123
A final consideration which indicates that organizations will be
able to avoid standing problems is that such organizations are likely
to adopt a strategy of concentrating on a few carefully selected cases
in order to establish meaningful precedents in the air pollution field.
Such cases, which will invariably involve major polluters and serious
actual or potential damage to the environment, will be characterized
by sharply defined issues and vigorously contesting parties, and are
therefore the kind of cases least likely to raise difficult standing
questions.
121. E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
122. H. HART &: H. WECHSLER, supra note 112, at 174.
123. Although such an approach might once have been thought to be ethically
improper and perhaps illegal, it appears to be permissible within the language of the
Supreme Court in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1963): "However valid may
be Virginia's interest in regulating ... barratry, maintenance and champerty, that interest does not justify the prohibition disclosed by the record. . . . Malicious intent was
of the essence of the common law offenses .•••" See also ABA ConE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPONSIBILlTY AND CANONS OF JUDICtAL ETHICS, CANON 2, at 2-3 (1970): "The giving of
advice that one should take legal action could well be in fulfillment of the duty of the
legal profession to assist laymen in recognizing legal problems."
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Thus, it is likely that in at least some cases it will be held that
an injunctive action against an air polluter is justiciable and that
conservation organizations have standing to bring the action. Traditional principles would not have dictated that result, for the doctrines of justiciability and standing have customarily been used by
courts to implement general policies of judicial restraint. But recent
Supreme Court pronouncements advance the theory that those doctrines do not have clearly defined limits. Moreover, policy considerations enter into deliberations about justiciability and standing, and
cases involving pollution are likely to receive sympathetic attention
by courts in light of the current fervor over environmental quality.
C.. The Inadequacy of the Remedy at Law
If a plaintiff in an air pollution suit is able to satisfy a court as
to his standing and as to the justiciability of the issues he is raising,
two other prerequisites to the availability of equitable relief will
become pertinent: there must be no adequate remedy at law, and the
plaintiff cannot have delayed unreasonably in bringing the case to
court. It is unlikely that either of those doctrines would prevent a
decision on the merits in an air pollution case, but it is necessary to
discuss them since it may be necessary to demonstrate to a court
that both prerequisites are satisfied.
It is a traditional rule of equity that injunctive relief will not be
granted "when the legal remedy of compensatory damages would be
complete and adequate."124 Accordingly, if a plaintiff in an air
pollution suit can be adequately compensated with money for the
injury which he suffers, he will not be able to obtain an injunction.
The validity of this traditional rule has been challenged; 125 but "at
least in form, the adequacy test remains on the books and appears
in the case law."126
The concept of inadequacy is in no sense a clear one. Under the
most lenient application of the test, injunctive relief may be granted
so long as the legal remedy is not as adequate as the equitable remedy
would be. 127 Usually, however, the determination whether the legal
remedy is sufficiently adequate to preclude equitable relief is a
matter left to the court's discretion. In general, a damage remedy
124. POMEROY § 1338, at 936.
125. Injunctions 1021-22. See, e.g., Steggles v. National Discount Corp., 326 Mich.
44, 39 N.W.2d 237 (1949).
126. Injunctions 998.
127. Steggles v. National Discount Corp., 326 Mich. 44, 50-51, 39 N.W.2d 237, 239-40
(1949). Presumably, if the legal remedy were as adequate, the plaintiff would not request
equitable relief,
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is considered inadequate in two circumstances. First, it is inadequate
if the type of injury suffered is such that the amount of money
needed to compensate the injured party cannot be accurately calculated.128 Second, it is inadequate when money damages are an insufficient form of relief because the injury is thought to be an irreparable one129 or, perhaps, because the defendant is unable to pay
money damages to the extent necessary for just compensation.130
Under either of these tests, a damage remedy will often be an
inadequate form of relief in an air pollution suit.131 It is difficult,
if not impossible, to calculate accurately the value of the damage
that past air pollution has caused to health, to the environment, and
to property. Moreover, measuring the extent of future injury is at
best a speculative venture; the evidence that such injury will occur
may be clear, but quantifying that injury in dollar terms is virtually
impossible.132 The monetary appraisal of the injury caused by a
single defendant's pollution is further complicated by the fact that
in many instances the plaintiff is suffering damage from pollutants
emanating from many sources.133 Attributing the correct share of
that damage to an individual defendant may be theoretically possible but is not feasible as a practical matter.134 Compounding this
attribution problem is the fact that much of the injury caused by
pollution results from contaminants that are the end product of
chemical reactions among many substances in the atmosphere.135
It is therefore even theoretically impossible in many cases to ap128. Injunctions 1002-04.
129. See Norris v. NLRB, 177 F.2d 26, 28 (1949). An injury is "irreparable" if the
victim cannot be fully compensated by any amount of money. Injunctions 1002-04.
130. There has been considerable debate over the question whether insolvency
renders a legal remedy inadequate. See, e.g., Horack, Insolvency and Specific Performance, 31 HARv. L. R.Ev. 702 (1918); Mcclintock, Adequacy of Ineffective Remedy at
Law, 16 MINN. L. R.Ev. 233 (1932). The trend of the cases appears to be toward relaxing
the requirement of inadequacy and, therefore, toward recognizing insolvency as a
sufficient reason to permit the invocation of equity jurisdiction. See note 125 supra and
accompanying text.
131. Although much is known about pollution generally, the plaintiff in any particular case will have to provide experts to analyze the specific types of pollutants in the
geographic area encompassed by the suit to determine their source and possible effects,
and to explain those findings, as well as their meaning in terms of the appropriate
remedy, to the court. The Environmental Defense Fund will provide experts at cost
for some types of cases, but often the costs for expert study and testimony are high.
For discussion of the use of experts at trial, see Sive, Securing, Examining, and CrossExamining Expert Witnesses in Environmental Cases, 68 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1175 (1970).
132. A STUDY OF POLLUTION 13.
133. See note 49 supra.
134. With respect to an injunction, however, the fact that others besides the defendant or defendants are also contributing damaging pollutants to the air should not
act to bar such relief. See Waier v. Peerless Oil Co., 265 Mich. 398, 251 N.W. 552 (1933).
135. See note 49 supra.
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portion responsibility among the various polluters contributing
the original chemical substances. Because injunctive relief operates
only prospectively, there is less need to be concerned with determining the precise extent of the defendant's contribution to the
pollution. Money damages may also be inadequate because much
of the injury caused by air pollution is irreparable. Damage to
health, destruction of wildlife, and disruptions of the weather and
the eco-system generally, cannot be rectified by any amount of
monetary reparation. 136
A different approach to the inadequacy requirement has been developed by some courts, which have created what amounts to a rule of
per se inadequacy in certain categories of cases. For example, a damage remedy is often considered inadequate, and an injunction issued,
whenever the injury caused to the plaintiff is a continuing one. 137
The reason for this approach is that if the injury is continuous, any
remedy other than an injunction may lead to the undesirable result
of necessitating periodic suits by the plaintiff.138 An air pollution
case seems quite likely to fall within this category. Any other approach would not only have the result that the plaintiff in the
particular case might be compelled to bring periodic suits in the
future, but would also ignore the existence of other individuals who
are potentially plaintiffs and who should not be required to bring
actions in the future. 13 9
A rule of equity that is closely related to the problem of adequacy
is the traditional view that equity will not enjoin a criminal act
unless there is a statute providing for injunctive relief. 140 There are
three bases for this rule: first, there is a presumption that a criminal
136. In most of the reported cases, courts failed to mention the detrimental health
effects of pollution. E.g., Prauner v. Battle Creek Co-op. Creamery, 173 Neb. 412, 113
N.W.2d 518 (1962); Elliott Nursery Co. v. Duquesne Light Co., 281 Pa. 166, 126 A. 345
(1924). The failure of most courts to treat health effects and to speak rather in terms
of odor and discomfort seems to stem in part from a failure of plaintiff's counsel to
emphasize health factors adequately. With the rapidly accumulating knowledge of the
harm caused by air pollution, such a failure today would be inexcusable. Health
effects, however, are not always ignored. See, e.g., Woodyear v. Schaefer, 57 Md. I, 12
(1881), in which the court stated that if a nuisance operates to destroy health, an action
at law furnishes no adequate remedy.
137. Injunctions 1001; W. WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY § 30 (1930); e.g., Donovan
v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U.S. 279, 304-05 (1905).
138. Injunctions 1001; W. WALSH, supra note 137, at § 30.
139. An alternative to injunctive relief, which has been developed in some cases of
continuing injury, involves making a present award of damages for future injury
[e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1970)] or an award of a continuing payment [e.g., Bates v. Quality Ready-Mix Co.,
154 N.W.2d 852 (Iowa 1967)]. See generally Injunctions 1001. Such approaches are inappropriate in an air pollution case, both because damages are so difficult to quantify
and because there are a number of other potential plaintiffs whose interests would
be best protected by an injunction.
140. Injunctions 996.
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penalty provides adequate protection for the interests that would
be injured by a violation of the criminal statute; 141 second, there is
a notion that prosecutorial discretion is desirable and that private
parties should not be allowed to interfere with its exercise; 142 and
third, there is a view that some acts are made criminal not because
the legislature desires to prevent them, but because it desires to make
those who engage in them pay a fee. 143 This doctrine appears, however, to be losing support; and some courts have recently been
willing to grant injunctions to bar criminally punishable conduct
when the public prosecutor has been reluctant to bring criminal
action144 or when the criminal sanction is a trivial one. 145
Although statutes regulating air pollution are not generally
thought of as part of the penal code, many of them povide that
violators may be found guilty of a misdemeanor. 146 Accordingly, the
traditional rule might be interpreted to bar private injunctive action
against polluters. However, air pollution suits seem to be appropriate cases for departure from the rigid confines of the traditional
dogma, because the available criminal sanctions are nominal and are
seldom enforced. 147 Since defendants in air pollution suits are invariably corporations, it is probable that courts will dismiss concern over interfering with prosecutorial discretion or upsetting
the legislative design. There is simply too great a likelihood that
nonenforcement of criminal sanctions is not the result of a governmental policy judgment that should be permitted, but rather the
result of either an exertion of political power by industrial concerns
or an irrational hesitancy on the part of enforcement officials to
apply criminal sanctions to corporate entities.
Regardless of whether the traditional rule retains vitality, air
pollution suits may well fall within an exception to that rule. That
exception is that a private plaintiff may bring a nuisance action to
141. POMEROY § 1347. It is probably true that the existence of a criminal statute
has very much the same effect as an outstanding injunction. The major difference is,
perhaps, the greater ease with which contempt may be punished. That difference
provides sound reason for adhering to the traditional view.
142. See Miles-Lee Auto Supply Co. v. Bellows, 26 Ohio Op. 2d 452, 197 N.W.2d
247 (C.P. 1964).
143. This view is often expressed in terms of concern that the injunction may be
more severe than the criminal penalty. See, e.g., Miles-Lee Auto Supply Co. v. Bellows,
27 Ohio Op. 2d 452, 197 N.E.2d 247 (C.P. 1964).
144. Injunctions 1016.
145. Injunctions 1017. But see note 143 supra.
146. See Mix, The Misdemeanor Approach to Pollution Control, 10 Aruz. L. REv.
90 (1968). Regulations or statutes may specifically provide for criminal penalties or
they may be couched in terms of public nuisance, the creation or maintenance of which
is a crime. POMEROY § 1349.
147. See Hill 61, at col. 1. Some states by statute allow private suits to enjoin some
criminally punishable conduct. See, e.g., Black v. Circuit Ct. of the 8th Judicial Cir.,
78 S.D. 320, 101 N.W.2d 520 (1960).
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enjoin criminally punishable conduct if he can show "a special and
particular injury distinct from that suffered by him in common with
the public at large." 148 In many air pollution cases, a private plaintiff
may be able to demonstrate that he qualifies under this exception;
and that possibility is made especially likely by the increased evidence of the adverse effects of air pollution upon health and property.149 Many detrimental health effects are particular to the
individual in that they relate to his own distinctive physiology, and
property damage is similarly distinct if it involves a particular aspect
of the plaintiff's land or personalty.150
Since a legal remedy is seldom adequate in an air pollution
suit, a plaintiff's request for an injunction is not likely to be denied
on that ground. In virtually every case damages are difficult to calculate, and in many instances the harm caused is irreparable. Moreover, if an injunction is not issued, the damages are likely to
continue and to generate a multiplicity of actions.
D. Laches
The notion that a, plaintiff's delay in bringing suit may bar him
from obtaining injunctive relief is often introduced under the rubric
"equity aids the vigilant."151 The purpose of this rule-the doctrine
of laches-is to protect the defendant in an equity action when the
plaintiff's delay has caused the defendant to act to his mm detriment.152 Accordingly, the doctrine applies only when the plaintiff's
delay is unreasonable under the circumstances of the case and when
the defendant is prejudiced in some way by the delay.
In the typical air pollution case, it is doubtful that a defense of
laches can be successfully asserted. Most of the scientific evidence
concerning the adverse effects of air pollution is of recent origin and
thus any delay in bringing suit will not usually be unreasonable.
Indeed, until recently, there may have been no factual basis upon
which a plaintiff could have sustained a cause of action against a
polluter. Furthermore, most defendants are polluters who established their industrial facilities long before the detrimental effects
of air pollution were a matter of public knowledge.153 Only those
polluters who built their plants after such information became
widespread, and whose plans were knmm to the plaintiffs, will be
able to assert successfully the doctrine of !aches.
148. POMEROY§ 1349.
149. The current liberalizing of the meaning of "particular injury" also makes this
possibility more likely. See Injunctions 1014.
150. See generally MCCLINTOCK § 164; Injunctions 1013-16.
151. See MCCLINTOCK § 28, at 71.
152. Id.
153. See Wall St. J., March 23, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
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One argument that a defendant might assert in order to obtain
the application of !aches is that he would have constructed his facility
elsewhere if he had been confronted with an injunctive action. Any
such claim of prejudice is weakened substantially by the fact that the
current intensity of the conservation movement provides at least
constructive notice that any activities which cause pollution are
likely to be challenged. Moreover, if a defendant's conduct constitutes a violation of statutory air pollution standards that were in
effect at the time the defendant constructed his facility, the defense
of !aches should not be available. No defendant can reasonably contend that a failure of private plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief sanctioned a violation of the statutory standards. A claim of prejudice
is further weakened by the availability of procedures by which a
company, prior to constructing a facility, can seek a declaratory
judgment as to the permissible quantity and quality of emissions.
Thus, the equitable defense of !aches, like the defense of an adequate
remedy at law, is not likely to preclude a decision on the merits in
an air pollution suit.

IV.

THE DECISION ON THE MERITS: BALANCING THE EQUITIES

If the technical requirements for injunctive relief are satisfied in
a particular case, the court will proceed to exercise its discretion by
"balancing the equities." 154 This notion of balancing the equities is
of particular significance in an air pollution suit, since it means that
the ultimate resolution of the controversy will turn upon the judge's
analysis of broad policy questions and his determination as to what
is fair under the circumstances of the case.155 The outcome of the
case will depend upon the balance which the judge strikes between
the plaintiff's need for relief and the cost and hardship, both to the
defendant and to the community, that would attend the granting of
relief.156
154. McCLINTOCK § 44, at 383. In the discussion that follows, no attempt is made to
di~tinguish between the showing necessary to obtain an affirmative decree and that
required to obtain a prohibitory decree. Though American courts have frequently
suggested a stronger showing is needed to obtain the mandatory order, the distinction
is seldom actually applied to suits for permanent injunctions. Injunctions 1061-62;
PO?,IEROY § 1359.
155. The question of a trial court's competence to balance all the factors and resolve
an environmental case is much debated. See, e.g., Sax, Explanatory Memorandum for
the Proposed Natural Resources Conservation and Environmental Protection Act of
Michigan (printed and distributed by the West Michigan Environmental Action
Council), stating that trial judges are quite capable of deciding these issues; and
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219,257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970),
in which the court stated that it lacked the expertise necessary to fashion an appropriate injunction for the control of emission.
156. See, e.g., City of Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Mfg., 289 U.S. 334 (1933); Dundalk.
Holding Co. v. Easter, 215 Md. 549, 137 A.2d 667 (1958). If the judge finds that the costs
of correcting an air pollution problem are greater than the value of the benefits that
can be derived from the correction, an injunction will not issue, even though it is in-
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Of course the task of weighing relative costs and benefits is necessarily fraught both with value judgments concerning the importance of some kinds of benefits and with the difficulty of appraising
different types of monetary and nonmonetary costs. Such value judgments are especially prevalent in the environmental context, since
it is often necessary in such cases to balance the economic costs of
terminating a pollutant discharge with the economic and noneconomic benefits that will result from cleaner air. Thus, the value
predilections of a particular judge may often be dispositive in individual cases. 157
Before the judge can balance the relative merits, however, the
parties must present evidence. The case which the plaintiff will
present is apparent: he will present the evidence concerning the
dangers of pollution to himself and to the community as a whole. 108
The defendant is then faced with the burden of persuading the
judge that equity would not be served by the issuance of an injunction. The defendant's primary line of defense is likely to be a
demonstration that the imposition of costs associated with pollution
abatement would cause more harm than would the activities of which
the plaintiff complains. 159 Such a demonstration of significant cost to
disputable that the plaintiff is suffering some injury. See Gilpin v. Jacob Ellis
Realties, Inc., 47 N.J. Super. 26, 135 A.2d 204 (1957). "Cost" is used in the generic
sense, not in the strictly monetary sense. Professor McClintock has summarized the
factors that a court should consider as follows:
In determining whether to exercise its discretion to grant or refuse an injunction, the court should balance all of the equities, which include not only the
relative hardships to the parties, but their conduct with reference to the transaction,
the nature of the interests affected, and the relative proportion of the interests of
each that will be lost by whichever course of action is taken.
MCCLINTOCK 383.
157. Of course, the court need not accept the exact relief requested by either the
plaintiff or the defendant. See notes 185-87 infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the various types of injunctions that might issue, see note 182 infra.
158. Such an argument may not be possible regarding community damages. It is,
however, analogous to the clearly accepted notion that equity can consider potential
harm to third persons or to the general public from the granting of an injunction.
For example, some courts have refused to enjoin a damaging practice because enjoining
it would likely result in a number of persons becoming unemployed. E.g., McCarthy
v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co., 164 F. 927 (9th Cir. 1908).
Most cases in which injunctions are sought involve injury to only one or a few persons, but in the air pollution context many are being injured. If the plaintiff were
to bring a class action, the weighing of the benefit which would result from granting
the injunction would include all the members of the class. Class actions are sometimes
difficult to bring, however, and it therefore seems appropriate as a general rule that
if a judge can recognize harm to third persons from granting an injunction, he should
be able to consider harm to third persons from not granting the i1:1junction. Cf.
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1970), which seems to indicate a consideration of the public benefit to be achieved
from granting an injunction.
159. Most economists recognize air pollution as an external diseconomy-a business
cost that is borne presently by persons or groups other than the businesses
doing the polluting. They agree that some way of internalizing the costs should be
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a defendant will not, by itself, prevent the issuance of an injunction;100 but such a demonstration will often be weighed heavily by
a court,161 and the cost of pollution abatement may well be substantia1.102
There are three cost arguments that a defendant may advance.163
First, he may argue as a matter of policy that the increased cost of
production and the increased price of the commodity which will
£ollow104 probably are not justified by the marginal benefits of pollution abatement. Second, he may show that the cost of complying with
an injunction would be so great that the imposition of that cost would
require him either to shut down his operation entirely or to move
his business to another location. Such action would arguably lead to
found. See generally Rose, The Economics of Environmental Quality, FORTUNE, Feb.
1970, at 120; Wolozin, The Economics of Air Pollution: Central Problems, 33 LAw &:
CONTEMP. PROB. 227-38 (1968); Stepp &: Macaulay, supra note 23, at ll-15. Although
recognizing that pollution is an external diseconomy, Stepp & Macaulay suggest that
there are significant limitations on a court's ability to remedy the effects of diseconomy.
Id. at 12-21.
160. The Supreme Court, in a case of original jurisdiction, has enjoined the operation of an entire copper smelting plant because of its air pollution. Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). A recent example of alleged high cost not stopping
the issuance of an injunction is the issuance of a preliminary injunction barring construction of a 390-mile, $110 million oil pipeline access road in Alaska. The injunction
was sought by three conservation groups relying in part on the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852; and the order was issued despite
claims that delay in building the road would result in "unprecedented economic
disaster." N.Y. Times, April 27, 1970, at 25, col. 1.
161. See, e.g., Gilpin v. Jacob Ellis Realties, Inc., 47 N.J. Super. 26, 135 A.2d 204
(1957).
162. See generally Davenport, Industry Starts the Big Cleanup, FORTUNE, Feb. 1970,
at ll4. But see Gerhart, Incentives to Air Pollution Control, 33 LAw &: CONTEMP. PROB.
358, 363 (1968), suggesting that costs for some industries may be quite low.
163. The defendant's cost arguments would be virtually the same if there were
applicable statutory emissions standards. But if the plaintiff is seeking to enforce
existing legislatively determined standards, the argument can be made that the standards represent a political determination of the best long-term interests of the jurisdiction and that the court, in its balancing, should accept that determination unless the
immediate community harm from the granting of the injunction would be very severe.
164. The effect of the increased costs on the price of goods has been given a considerable amount of attention by economists who have studied the ability of the firm to
shift the incidence of taxes. The ability of a firm to shift the costs of pollution control
will depend on the nature of the cost and the nature of the industry. If the costs are
fixed and the firm is in a monopoly position, it is unlikely that the costs can be passed
on to the consumer at all. Cf. R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 309-II
(1959). If the cost varies with output and the firm is in a highly competitive industry,
there will likely be no short-run effect, but in the long run some portion of the cost
will be shifted to consumers; the portion which will be shifted depends upon the
price elasticities of the relevant supply and demand curves. Cf. J. DuE, GOVERNMENT
FINANCE 264-66 (1963). These conclusions are, however, theoretical. In practice, it has
been found that even in the short run there is a shifting of costs which increase in
proportion to output. M. KRzYZA.NIAX & R. MUSGRAVE, THE SHIFTING OF THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX (1963). This seeming inconsistency may be explained by the fact that
the assumptions which form the basis of the economic analyses do not precisely reflect
"real-world" conditions.
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unemployment, a reduced tax base, and general economic decline in
the area in which the company is operating.165 Finally he may contend that although the company might not be immediately forced
out of business, the cost of compliance would be so great that the
company would be placed at a competitive disadvantage with other
enterprises which are not required to abate their pollution.
Any attempt to analyze these cost arguments must take account
of a variety of economic factors such as the extent of the controls
ordered, the economic condition of the defendant, the characteristics of the defendant's industry, and the economic conditions of
the geographic area in which the defendant's enterprise is located. 166
Thus, it is necessary to view separately the various types of enterprises that may be challenged in pollution suits in order to determine whether any of the cost arguments may be successfully
maintained.
If the alleged polluter is a governmental body or a regulated
industry, only the first of the above cost arguments is pertinent. The
government can meet increased costs through its power of taxation,
and the regulated industry can include the increment as a cost factor,
at least part of which will be recovered through its rate structure.167
In both situations, the increased costs or a significant part of them
are passed on directly to the public, and in neither situation is there
any problem of competitive disadvantage. To the extent that the
costs can be shifted to the public, there seems little reason for denying the injunction, for in that situation the public would both benefit from the pollution abatement and pay for it. Thus, the only
question facing a court in such cases is to determine whether an
increased cost to the public is outweighed by the advantages of clean
165. It has been argued that such economic arguments as these should not be given
much credibility. Jackson, Foreword: Environmental Quality, the Courts, and the
Congress, 68 MICH. L. Rm'. 1073 (1970). See also LEwis 250:
While Benjamin Linsky was air pollution control officer of the San Francisco Bay
area, he reported that in 14 years of nationwide study he had come across only two
instances of the actual shutting down of a plant because of local air pollution regulations. More typically, the plant's investment is simply too great for it to up and
move.
166. To lessen the impact of general cost arguments, a plaintiff may wish to point
out examples of industries which have instituted pollution control programs without
adverse effects. See LEWIS 245-46; J. BERGMAN & S. LENoRMAND, supra note 20, at 141-42.
He may also wish to show that adverse economic effects do not necessarily follow from
even a very strict regulation of emissions. In Los Angeles, for example, rather stringent
emission standards have been enforced for a number of years without particularly affecting its ability to attract and hold industry. In fact, it has been suggested that Los
Angeles did not start acting against pollution until there were adverse effects on the
business climate. NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 1970, at 45.
167. Of course, if the rates are increased, the quantity demanded should decline and
the company would then bear some part of the cost indirectly, at least if it was operating at the point of profit maximization prior to the price increase. The effect of the
price increase would depend upon the price elasticities of supply and demand. See
note 164 supra.
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air. If there is a pertinent statute prohibiting the pollution, the
decision should be especially clear, for then it can be said that the
public has already expressed a desire to bear the necessary costs of
abatement.
Similarly, some large industrial enterprises-especially those in
oligopolistic industries-may be able to make only a modified form
of the first cost argument. For such enterprises, the cost of abatement
might be small relative to the size of operating costs and might never
be passed on to consumers. 168 In such cases, the only real objection
would be that of the shareholders, who would eventually have to
absorb the cost in reduced profits. The position of the corporation is
more deserving of concern than is the position of the government
in the situation described above, for the corporation's shareholders
cannot be identified with the beneficiaries of reduced pollution.
Nevertheless, the interest of the shareholders seems to be outweighed
by the damage caused by pollution, especially in light of the compelling policy argument that the cost of clean air is a business cost
that should be internalized and should not be thrust upon society.
If the situation exists in which the costs of abating pollution will
require that the defendant cease doing business, that concern is a ·
significant reason for denying the injunction.169 Nevertheless, there
are several reasons why a defendant's economic hardship should not
necessarily constitute a defense. Historically, such arguments have
not been dispositive; courts have enjoined pollution practices even
when it appeared that the injunction would compel the defendant
to cease his business operations completely.170 In addition, the plaintiff's argument that pollution control costs are production costs
that should be internalized may be coupled with the view that if an
enterprise cannot survive when it must pay all the costs of production, then it represents an inefficient allocation of resources and
should not survive.171 It would clearly be incongruous to allow
inefficiency to justify continued pollution.172 If there are undesirable consequences that may attend the issuance of an injunc168. Larger firms would be able to absorb the cost more easily than small firms
only if the cost does not vary in proportion to the size of the operation or if the firm
is earning economic profits due to a lack of competition. See note 164 supra.
169. Wolozin suggests that the smaller a firm is relative to the average firm in the
industry, the heavier will be the financial burden of abatement. Wolozin, supra note
159, at 237.
170. E.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
171. See generally P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 442, 447, 450-51 (7th ed. 1967).
172. Any kind of regulation will probably cause problems for marginal businesses,
but that does not mean that the regulation should be unenforced. In the case of minimum wage laws or in-plant safety regulations, for example, a legislative "balancing"
decision was made, and some marginal producers no doubt went out of business as a
result; but the view that those producers should be exempt from the regulations has
never been accepted.
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tion,173 then those consequences should be considered by the court,
but should not necessarily be dispositive.
If the reason that the cost of pollution abatement constitutes a
hardship is that the company merely lacks the required capital to
finance the necessary technological changes, methods may be devised
to furnish the necessary funds. 174 While the court itself does not have
the capacity to provide capital, a judge may take cognizance of
potential sources of capital or existing tax incentives, and may frame
his injunction order accordingly. 175
The arguments presented above also apply to a defendant who
claims that requiring the imposition of pollution controls will place
him at a long-term competitive disadvantage. Furthermore, the current expansion in the nationwide effort to end pollution militates
against any argument by a defendant that his competitors will not
be forced to incur the cost of pollution control. 176 If the defendant's
competition is local, the plaintiff may preclude any competitivedisadvantage argument by joining as defendants all the local producers of the same goods or services. If all the producers are
not polluters, then those that do pollute are operating relatively
inefficiently and should be forced either to incur the cost of abatement or to cease doing business.
Another reason why cost arguments may not be justified-for any
class of defendants-is that the actual long-term costs of pollution
abatement may not be as substantial as many businessmen imagine.
173. A tendency to oligopoly might be created, for example, if the number of
marginal producers were decreased while the price of entry was raised. Similarly, there
might be an increase in short-term unemployment.
174. For instance, over 90% of the manufacturing industries facing the greatest
abatement costs-food, paper, chemical, petroleum refining, and primary metals-would
be eligible for Small Business Administration loans. Money may also be available from
the Economic Development Administration. Gerhardt, supra note 162, at 363-64. Cities
and states might also set up public corporations to make long-term, low-interest
loans available for pollution abatement. Similarly, it might be possible to approach
some problems of air pollution control in the same way that municipalities often
approach the need for industrial sewerage treatment: the municipality either builds or
buys the control equipment and then leases it to the polluter. Finally, tax: incentives
might be offered to permit businesses to amortize pollution control facilities. See, e.g.,
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 704 (Dec. 30, 1969).
175. In some cases a judge might even condition the granting of an injunction on
the defendant's ability to get capital from some source. Similarly, the injunction might
require abatement only as capital becomes available. This approach might be made
more definite if the defendant's potential earnings are examined and an abatement
schedule is constructed in light of those anticipated profits.
176. Here again, the imaginative framing of an injunction order could reduce the
impact of any competitive disadvantage. Abatement could, for example, be ordered in
progressive stages so that there would be time for suits against other members of the
industry. Similarly, in highly competitive situations the judge might order only that
the defendant meet the emission standards of the lightest polluter in his industry in
the area.
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Indeed, prompt action to control pollution may be economically
advantageous in the long run. There have been a number of instances, for example, in which companies have been compelled
under protest to reduce their pollutant emissions and have subsequently found that the control devices literally paid for themselves. 177
Moreover, it seems likely that evidence of the harmful effects of
air pollution will continue to grow, which will lead to stricter regulatory controls and an increased likelihood that plaintiffs will be
able to maintain successful damage actions against polluters. By
acting at an early date to curb air pollution, a polluter may be foreclosing the possibility of governmental regulation and costly litigation.
Since the guiding principle of equity courts is discretion, the
outcome of any particular case necessarily depends upon the judge's
evaluation of the unique facts of the case and his predisposition
toward the various interests involved. Predictability is further complicated by the lack of precedent in this evolving field. In most of
the older cases in which injunctions were sought under nuisance
principles, the court was limited to t:1vo alternatives: it could either
allow the pollution to continue or it could completely shut down
the company. 178 Today, however, the technology of air pollution
control is such that defendants seldom can argue that significant
abatement would be impossible without closing down their operation; thus the range of possible relief is greatly expanded.179
Given the wide range of possible remedies, the question arises
what standards the court should apply in framing particular in177. Much air pollution represents the waste of usable material, and many companies have been able to pay some or all of their abatement costs by using the materials recovered. Indeed, some companies have even earned a profit by developing
activities for utilizing their trapped emissions. See, e.g., LEWIS 246-48; J. BERGMAN &:
S. LENORMAND, supra note 20, at 87-88; Gerhardt, supra note 162, at 362.
178. E.g., Bliss v. Washoe Copper Co., 186 F. 789 (9th Cir. 19ll); Elliott Nursery Co.
v. Duquesne Light Co., 281 Pa. 166, 126 A. 345 (1924).
179. Cases in the past have indicated a wide variety of approaches to the question
of balancing interests in this area. For example, the pollution from 50 coke ovens
operating 24 hours a day, seven days a week, has been characterized as only a "petty
annoyance." Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 142 Misc. 329, 254 N.Y .S. 403 (1931),
affd. mem., 336 App. Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229 (1932). But other courts have recognized
the health hazard from oil refinery fumes and required their abatement. ·waier v.
Peerless Oil Co., 265 Mich. 398, 251 N.W. 552 (1933).
Many of the older economic and industrial neighborhood justifications for allowing
pollution no longer seem persuasive. Not only has the evidence of the detrimental
health and property effects of air pollution increased, but also the pervasiveness of
pollution in many communities makes a distinction between industrial and residential
neighborhoods impossible to apply. An interesting dilemma may face a plaintiff in an
industrial area. The best way to reduce air pollution would be to attempt to join as
many polluters as defendants as possible. Yet the more that are joined, the more persuasive the defendants' community-economics arguments may be.
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junctions. In most air pollution suits,180 the plaintiff seeks an injunction that would require the defendant to apply existing technology to the control of his pollutant emissions. 181 Such a request
for an order compelling the adoption of available control procedures
avoids putting the court in the position of requiring that a firm cease
doing business. 182 As a result, a court will probably be more willing
to issue an injunction than it would be if the plaintiff sought to
have emissions limited to a certain level, without regard for technological feasibility. 183 Since existing technology is quite advanced
and is capable of significantly reducing the level of pollutant emissions from any source, there seems little reason for a plaintiff to
insist on the impossible. 184
180. There would be an exception in cases of highly toxic emissions which existing
control practices cannot prevent. This type of emission should probably be immediately
curtailed even if it is necessary to close the plant of the defendant.
181. A number of cases indicate that a defendant cannot be required to meet any
standard higher than that which is possible under existing technology. See, e.g., Bliss
v. Washoe Copper Co., 186 F. 789 (9th Cir. 19ll), and Koseris v. J.R. Simplot Co., 82
Idaho 263, 352 P .2d 235 (1960), both holding that an injunction will not issue if the
defendant can show it used the "best known" or most "modem" methods of production
and emission control.
For a discussion of the defense of industry standards as a bar to the enforcement of
statutory standards, see Pollack, Legal Boundaries of Air Pollution Control, 33 LAw &:
CONTEMP. PROB. 330, 343-48 (1968).
182. It may be that in some localities existing regulations allow levels of pollutant
emissions which are higher than the level which could possibly be achieved. Where
this is so, plaintiff will probably seek only to enforce the existing standards. Even if the
plaintiff does seek to have the lowest possible level of pollution ordered, it may be
likely, in the absence of a showing of very severe and immediate injury to the plaintiff,
that the court will accept the legislatively determined standards as controlling. In most
cases, such a decision by the court would be sound. The local standards probably
represent a finding that the ambient-air quality of the area is such that it can absorb
emissions at levels higher than those technically feasible. As the conditions of the
area change and knowledge about pollution increases, the standards will change. But
see notes 50-52 supra and accompanying text.
Compelling only the use of available procedures is an approach which allows the
court to shape its remedies. Depending upon the nature of a particular case, a judge
could fashion an order dealing with one or more of the following: emissions, control
equipment, fuels, efficiency and proper use of existing equipment, training of personnel to operate equipment, installation or manufacture of equipment (e.g., barring
use of a particular type of apartment incinerator). As technology improves, the court
could order that new devices be used by the defendant.
183. The 1967 Air Quality Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), requires
the federal courts in nonemergency suits initiated by HEW to consider the economic
and technological feasibility of controls. A state-of-the-art approach is also a flexible
standard which would allow the court to shape its remedies, and to keep jurisdiction
of a case, and to order implementation of increasingly stringent standards over time.
The 1967 Air Quality Act also requires HEW to develop and publish information
on techniques for preventing and controlling air pollution, including data on the cost
and effectiveness of alternative methods. 42 U.S.C. § I857c-2(i) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
This type of information would be invaluable to a judge attempting to shape a pollution abatement injunction.
184. This is a view shared by many. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF HEW 27; A STUDY OF
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If a particular plaintiff nonetheless insists upon an impractical
solution, it would be appropriate for the court to find a middle
ground. The court is not bound to the exact relief sought by the
plaintiff; rather, it can " ... adjust the remedy to the need" 185 and
may exercise its discretion in any appropriate manner.186 In most
instances, if an injunction is issued, its scope will be general; unless
it is clear what measures are appropriate, the offending party will
be allowed to "experiment" with measures that he thinks will
achieve the results which the court desires.187 For example, the court
might frame an injunction, based upon its estimate of the capabilities of the existing technology, requiring the defendant to reduce
his emissions to a certain level. The defendant would then be able
to adopt the control method of his choice in order to meet the
requisite standards. Abatement equipment, different fuels, and more
efficient and careful operation of existing equipment, might be used
by themselves or in combination, to lower emission levels. This existence of discretion in the trial judge is one of the most persuasive
reasons for attacking the pollution problem by using the courts of
equity. The same degree of flexibility is found in few other areas of
the law.
V.

SANCTIONS

If a court's order is disobeyed, the availability of sanctions becomes important. In the usual case, however, the matter will have
to be considered before an order is ever issued, for a traditional rule
of equity stipulates that "a court of equity will not issue an unenforceable decree of injunction."188 It has been suggested that this
rule has two aspects: relief will be denied if it appears that the court
would not be able to discover violations of its decree, and relief
will be denied if the court would not have the means to punish any
disobedience which might be discovered.189 This interpretation of
the rule appears sound, and offers a convenient means of assessing
the enforceability of injunctions against air polluters.
There are no major problems of enforceability in suits involving injunctions against air polluters. A court has power over all
polluters which have a stationary source within the jurisdiction.
POLLUTION 42-45; LEWIS 223-36; J. BERGMAN &: s. l.ENORMAND, supra note 20, at 85;
Yannacone, A Lawyer Answers the Technocrats, TRIAL, Aug.-Sept. 1969, at 14-15.
185. Alfred Jacobshagen Co. v. Dockery, 243 Miss. 511, 518, 139 S.2d 632, 634 (1962).
186. See generally Selder, Conditional, Experimental and Substitutional Relief, 16
RUTGERS L. REY. 639 (1962).
187. Five Oaks Corp. v. Gathmann, 190 Md. 348, 58 A.2d 656 (1948).
188. Hearne v. Smylie, 225 F. Supp. 645, 655 (D. Idaho), revd., 378 U.S. 563 (1964).
189. Injunctions 1012.
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Thus, with the possible exception of suits involving pollutants discharged in a state other than the forum state,190 the court may either
coerce compliance with its orders through civil-contempt sanctions191
or punish violators of its orders through the use of its criminalcontempt powers.192
Moreover, not only are the means available to punish disobedient
defendants, but any violations are easily discoverable as well. In
general, the inability to discover violations of an order may be due
either to a lack of standards by which compliance can be measured
or to an absence of the means by which it may be ascertained that
the defendant was disobedient. 193 In an air pollution suit, the knowledgeable use of discretion by a judge in framing an order of abatement that takes into account both existing technological capabilities
and available criteria for measuring pollution can produce definite
standards by which to determine compliance with the order. 194
Furthermore, those same standards may make it easy to discover
violations, especially if cost considerations do not prevent the use
of monitors and masters to oversee the implementation of the decree.195 If such costs are an important factor, the issuance of the
decree could be conditioned upon the plaintiff's payment of them.
A court will also refuse to issue an injunction if the complexity
or magnitude of enforcing it is sufficient to render it unmanageable.
Indeed, mere difficulty of enforcement, rather than actual impossibility, may be sufficient grounds for denying an injunction, and there
are numerous cases which cite problems of supervision, or the need
190. The problem of extraterritorial decrees, although potentially significant in this
field, are beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally Messner, The Jurisdiction
of a Court of Equity To Compel the Doing of Acts Outside the Territorial Limits of
the State, 14 MINN. L. REV. 494 (1930).
191. Either imprisonment or a fine is an appropriate civil-contempt sanction so long
as it is designed to coerce compliance or to compensate the plaintiff and is not designed
to punish the defendant for noncompliance. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336
U.S. 187 (1949).
192. Cf. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 428 (19II). The threat
of imprisonment appears to be especially effective when the defendants are corporate
executives, as is indicated by the history of the antitrust cases in which jail sentences
were imposed upon several corporate executives who had conspired to fix prices in
the electrical-equipment industry. See Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1961, at 2, col. I; cf. N.Y.
Times, March 12, 1961, at 1, col. 3.
193. Injunctions 1012.
194. See note 182 supra, for a suggestion of the types of injunctions which might
issue.
195. Injunctions 1012. For example, equipment or fuel could be checked by inspection, and emissions could be checked by existing measuring devices. See Ludwig,
Air Pollution Control Technology: Research and Development on New and Improved
Systems, 33 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 217, 226 (1968); Silveston, Detecting and Measuring
Pollution, in THE POLLUTION READER 209 (1968). Efficient operation might be, in part,
enhanced by requiring operating certificates for equipment or by requiring training
for personnel.
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for continuous supervision as adequate grounds for denying injunctive relief.196 The difficulty of supervision for a court in an air pollution suit depends upon the number of defendants involved197 and
the type of abatement order that is issued.198 Since supervision will
never be completely impossible, it is difficult to know how much
weight a particular judge will attach to the degree of enforcement
difficulty existing in a particular fact situation.199 Nevertheless, the
level of supervision required should seldom be prohibitive since
the actual efforts at compliance need not be observed by the court;
the court may supervise compliance simply by measuring the level
of pollution discharged by the defendant. Again, if costs are a significant factor, it is appropriate to condition the decree upon their
payment by the plaintiff.
Thus, enforcement of a decree is not an insuperable obstacle,
and concern with enforcement should not lead to the denial of
injunctive relief. In fact, however, it is probably true that enforcement measures will be unnecessary. Corporations are generally
law-abiding entities and will no doubt comply with any orders that
are actually issued. Indeed, it is only through their cooperation,
either with courts or with legislatures, that the menace of toxic air
pollution will eventually be overcome.
196. E.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 272 F. Supp. 744 (D. Mass.
1967), a[fd., 390 F.2d 113 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 714 (1968); Peck v. State
Dept. of Highways, 350 P.2d 948 (Okla. 1960); Passaic-Athenia Bus Co. v. Consolidated
Bus Lines, 100 N.J. Eq. 185, 135 A. 284 (1926); Edelen v. Samuels & Co., 126 Ky. 295,
103 s.w. 260 (1907).
197. Once again the plaintiff is faced with a dilemma. See note 179 supra. The
more polluters that he attempts to join as defendants, the more severe become the
problems of enforcement. Perhaps by joining only those of a particular industry or
only those responsible for a particular type of pollution in any one case, the plaintiff
can reduce the court's fear of enforcement problems, because the measures necessary
for ensuring that the defendants carry out an abatement order would be basically
the same for each.
198. See note 195 supra. The amount of effort necessary to ensure compliance with
an order respecting the installation and use of abatement equipment, for example,
would be less than that necessary to ensure continued low emissions without requiring
any particular method for achieving them. But see note 29 supra, suggesting that anything other than generally worded abatement requirements leads to potentially inefficient use of resources.
199. There have been cases in which controls were enforced, although they have
usually involved only one defendant. See note 179 supra. On the other hand, some
cases simply frighten judges away. See, e.g., the $500 billion damage and injunction
suit brought in Los Angeles in which the judge in dismissing the case, said that it
was beyond the court's competence. Diamond v. General Motors Corp., No. 947,429
(Super. Ct., Cal., filed April 15, 1969).
It has been suggested that when a violation of constitutional rights requires an
injunction, courts worry less about enforcement problems. Injunctions 1012-13 (citing
civil rights and reapportionment cases). If the legal right upon which an air pollution
case rests is a constitutional one, this, of course, may mean that an injunction will
issue. See notes 97-99 supra and accompanying text.

